November 17, 2025
Since the PMF and its allies’ victory over ISIS, the group has transformed into one of Iraq’s most powerful paramilitary and political actors. This rise has enabled Iran to significantly expand its leverage over the Iraqi state. Guided by Tehran, the PMF and its affiliated political blocs have worked to expel United States forces, secure influence in parliament, and advance Iran’s wider regional objectives. In Iraq’s 2018 elections, the PMF aligned bloc placed second, helped in part by low voter turnout following the suppression of the Tishreen protest movement. In the December 2023 provincial elections, PMF affiliated parties won 101 of 285 council seats nationwide. These results highlight the degree to which Iran backed groups became central to Iraq’s political and security landscape and an important instrument of Iranian influence.
Recent political and regional developments, however, suggest that Iran’s position is weakening. During the 12 Days War, when Israel struck Iranian ballistic missile sites and nuclear facilities, PMF factions aligned with Iran remained unexpectedly silent and carried out no attacks on United States forces in Iraq. Although Israel is widely unpopular in Iraq, Iran is increasingly viewed with suspicion as well. Several Shia politicians have begun to question Tehran’s role openly. MP Diaa al Nasseri of Nouri al Maliki’s State of Law bloc praised Iraqi leaders for “sparing Iraq from strikes and the regional war” and stated that “Iranian influence is less prominent in Iraq’s new reality.”
Growing internal fragmentation has also limited Iran’s reach. Shia factions that previously operated as a unified pro Iran coalition have splintered. This is evident in the decision by PMF figures Faleh Fayyad and Ahmad al Assadi to run under Prime Minister Abdul Latif Rashid Sudani’s banner rather than on a collective pro Iran ticket. Other senior officials have increasingly emphasized Iraqi national interests. Deputy Speaker Mohsen al Mandalawi argued that “the decline of Iranian influence will not harm Iraq.” These political shifts reflect long-standing public frustration. Between 2019 and 2021, mass protests erupted across central and southern Iraq against Iranian influence and Iran backed militias. Although the militias maintained their power structures, their legitimacy suffered significantly.
Rising pressure from the United States has also constrained Tehran. Washington has relied on financial and legal tools to disrupt Iranian networks in Iraq. In 2023, it sanctioned fourteen Iraqi banks accused of funneling money to Iran. Because Iraq’s oil revenues are stored at the Federal Reserve Bank in New York, the United States retains the ability to delay or restrict financial transfers to Baghdad. This leverage helped block the PMF Integration Bill, which would have formalized the PMF as a permanent institution of the Iraqi state.
Some analysts, however, provide alternative explanations for the PMF’s restraint during the 12 Days War. After the conflict ended, PMF linked drone attacks resumed across Iraq and the Kurdistan Region. On July 27th, Kataib Hezbollah launched a major operation in Baghdad by storming the Agriculture Directorate after its preferred director was replaced. A firefight with Iraqi police left one Kataib Hezbollah fighter dead and several others were arrested. This sequence raised an important question. Why did Iranian backed forces act only after the war concluded? One likely explanation is fear of leadership targeting. Since October seventh, Israel had assassinated senior commanders in Hamas, the Houthis, Hezbollah, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Any PMF attack on United States positions during the war could have exposed its leaders to similar strikes. Remaining quiet may therefore have been a strategic choice aimed at preserving leadership and avoiding further fragmentation among an already divided set of Shia militias.
The evolution of the PMF illustrates both the rise and the limits of Iranian influence in Iraq. While the PMF initially served as a highly effective vehicle for Iran’s political and military reach, recent events including public discontent, shifting political alliances, renewed United States pressure, and the PMF’s caution during regional conflict have weakened Tehran’s ability to direct its Iraqi partners. Iraq’s domestic political dynamics are increasingly shaping PMF behavior, indicating a more complex balance of power in which Iran remains important but no longer exercises unchallenged authority.
Matthew MacKay is a M.A. student in the International Security program with the Schar School of Policy and Government at George Mason University. He has a B.A. (honors) in Political Science and a minor in History from the University of Connecticut. His academic interests are in hybrid warfare, Middle Eastern security, Eastern European security, and arms control.
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