October 10, 2025
Beijing’s biggest military parade in years took place on September 3rd, 2025. The striking image of Xi Jinping, Vladimir Putin, and Kim Jong Un standing together among other world leaders invited to the event highlighted the growing cooperation between China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran—the group referred to as the CRINK axis. While the imagery was carefully staged, the weapons displayed in the parade offered a stark preview of the direction conventional warfare is taking, as showcased by the CRINK members.
Among the parade’s displays were robotic quadrupeds equipped with mounted guns and sensors. Dismissed by some observers as gimmicks, these machines symbolize a broader shift: the integration of unmanned ground systems into the modern battlefield. In urban combat or tunnel warfare, these machines have the capability to scout, jam signals, or deliver explosives without risking soldiers. This new approach to non-human combat is now visible in Ukraine, where Iranian Shahed drones, produced at low cost, have been used to bypass sophisticated air defenses.
The parade in Beijing also showcased directed-energy systems—lasers and microwave weapons designed to neutralize drone swarms in conflict. Currently, defenders are using missiles costing hundreds of thousands of dollars to shoot down drones costing a fraction of that. Examples have been seen in Ukraine and Israel in the last few years. If lasers such as these can be deployed at scale, the economics of defense could shift decisively, making it far more expensive to attack than to defend. China, with its vast industrial capacity, is ideally positioned to mass-produce such systems and integrate them into layered air defenses.
Equally significant was the clear display of China’s nuclear triad—intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched JL-3s, and nuclear-capable bombers. This showing goes beyond deterrence. By exhibiting its nuclear readiness alongside hypersonic glide vehicles and unmanned undersea systems, China appears to be signaling that any conventional conflict in the South China Sea could play out under the shadow of its nuclear arsenal. Dominance of the seas, already being altered by advanced submarine warfare, will now become even more unpredictable as autonomous undersea vehicles come into play.
Taken individually, these technologies represent incremental advances. But within the broader framework of the CRINK axis, they form a system of complementary strengths. Russia’s war in Ukraine has become a live testing ground for Iranian drones, North Korean shells, and Chinese electronics supplied to Russia’s war effort. North Korea has shipped millions of artilleries rounds to Russia, while Iran’s drone technology continues to evolve in combat conditions. China, meanwhile, refines higher-end systems—from lasers to hypersonics—that add strategic depth to their capabilities.
What has emerged is not a formal alliance but rather a coalition of convenience. Russia consumes weapons at massive scale, Iran and North Korea provide much of the supply, and China pushes the technological frontier. This coalition enables the axis to sustain prolonged wars, outlast sanctions, and exhaust Western stockpiles. Military lessons learned in Ukraine—about drone swarms, electronic warfare, and targeting supply chains—are shared across borders and integrated into military planning.
The implications for the future of warfare are profound. Wars will increasingly be shaped by mass-produced autonomous systems, cheap drones backed by resilient supply chains, and hybrid arsenals that combine low-cost expendables with high-end nuclear and hypersonic deterrents. Drones and other autonomous systems will be used to disrupt the movement and supply of troops. Since CRINK members can share resources and circumvent sanctions, future conflicts may drag on longer than anticipated, grinding down Western resolve.
Democracies will need to adapt quickly. First, they must invest in layered drone defenses, including directed-energy weapons that can be deployed at scale rather than sophisticated systems limited to a handful of units. Second, they need to expand industrial production of munitions and drones to match the axis’s depth, ensuring that wars of attrition are not lost by default. Third, Western states must tighten controls on dual-use technologies—from microchips to precision optics—that continue to flow to Russia through global intermediaries despite sanctions. Finally, logistics must be dispersed, hardened, and defended, recognizing that supply lines will be the first and most vulnerable targets in any future conflict.
The Beijing parade was more than a spectacle. Instead, it was a signal that the future of warfare has begun—one led by the technologies listed above. The CRINK axis has been learning and adapting to fight together over the past three years to further their goals and ambitions. This raises the question of whether the rest of the free world will adapt in time—or whether democracies will be caught flat-footed as new technologies erode the conventional dominance they have long relied upon.
Tristan Witzig is a M.A. student in the International Security program with the Schar School of Policy and Government at George Mason University. He grew up in Switzerland prior to studying in the United States and holds a B.A. (honors) in History from the University of Leeds in the United Kingdom. Academic and research interests include US Foreign Policy and National Security, and how it relates to European and East Asia security. Considering a career as an analyst.
Image can be found here.
