April 1, 2026
Colombia plays a key role in Western Hemisphere security as the world’s largest cocaine producer and a hub for international criminal and insurgent groups. After over two decades of close U.S.-Colombia security cooperation, relations have cooled under President Gustavo Petro due to policy and ideological differences. As Colombia faces rising internal insecurity and the U.S. renews its regional focus, the upcoming presidential election will determine if Colombia revives its partnership with the U.S. or further weakens a relationship essential to hemispheric stability.
Despite years of security operations that once reduced coca cultivation to 48,000 hectares in 2012, Colombia’s cocaine production remains at historic highs, with 253,000 hectares under cultivation in 2023 and a 53% increase compared to 2022. Neighboring countries have become transit corridors and distribution hubs supplying markets in the U.S. and Europe, with organized crime rising rapidly and fueling violence and illicit economies including extortion, illegal mining, and human trafficking. Ecuador illustrates this spillover most starkly, where Colombia’s criminal enterprises fed and emboldened local gangs, triggering prison revolts and escalating urban violence.
Colombia’s internal security crisis is central to this regional deterioration, rooted in President Petro’s Total Peace policy (TPP). By reducing military pressure without strong compliance mechanisms, illegal armed groups expanded from over 15,000 members in 2022 to over 27,000 by 2025. The Global Terrorism Index reflects this failure, ranking Colombia 9th among countries most affected by terrorism in 2026, up from 16th in 2025. Against this backdrop, Colombians will choose their next president this summer, a decision with consequences extending well beyond their borders.
With 14 candidates remaining on the presidential ballot, three distinct contenders remain, each offering a clearly different security strategy: Iván Cepeda, who supports the continuation of the left-wing government’s negotiation-based security agenda; Paloma Valencia, who advocates for a conservative approach focused on aggressive military and law enforcement measures; and Abelardo de la Espriella, who positions himself as a populist outsider promising a hardline, rapid-response security policy.
Cepeda proposes continuing Petro’s human security approach, prioritizing individual rights over military strategy while maintaining the TTP. He has not indicated any plans to address its fundamental legal constraints: the constitution restricts legal benefits to politically motivated groups, leaving purely criminal organizations with little incentive to demobilize.
Valencia, representing the traditional center-right Centro Democrático party founded by former President Uribe, proposes strengthening the military, regaining territorial control through military action and intelligence operations, and implementing stronger counternarcotics policies. Her security vision echoes Uribe’s approach between 2002 and 2010, a period that saw significant reductions in armed group activity and coca cultivation, but was also marked by serious human rights abuses.
De la Espriella is the race’s outsider, drawing comparisons to El Salvador’s Bukele for his populist, anti-establishment appeal. He proposes a more aggressive security posture, including aerial operations against drug trafficking networks, forcible recovery of territories occupied by armed groups, and expanded counternarcotics cooperation with the United States.
As Colombians prepare to vote on May 31st, with a likely runoff on June 21st given the fragmented field, the latest polls show Cepeda leading with 35% of voting intention, followed by De la Espriella with 21% and Valencia with 16%. With a runoff almost certain and Cepeda likely to advance, the ideological distance between the final candidates will have major implications for regional security.
A continuation of the current agenda carries major consequences: unchanged policies will likely keep cocaine production at record levels, straining relations with Washington and possibly prompting harder unilateral U.S. measures. Relations with Ecuador are already tense over Bogotá’s counternarcotics performance, risking further deterioration of a critical regional partnership. Meanwhile, continued expansion of illicit economies would undermine democratic transition in Venezuela and complicate U.S. regional objectives.
An opposition victory would likely realign Colombia with U.S. counternarcotics objectives, restoring a partnership that has historically produced results. For Washington, this means greater cooperation from the country where much of the cocaine and organized crime originates, expanded operational access across Caribbean and Pacific corridors, and the possibility of resuming joint operations like those conducted in Ecuador this year. Such a realignment would also position Colombia as a key participant in the Shield of the Americas initiative, a U.S.-led regional security framework, deepening security and economic cooperation with the U.S. to counter narcotics and transnational organized crime across the region.
At a moment when the Trump administration has made hemispheric security a cornerstone of its foreign policy, and with Petro’s conduct having surfaced in early-stage U.S. criminal investigations, Colombia’s presidential election offers Washington either a willing partner or a deepening problem. The difference will be decided on June 21.
Lorena Tapias is a master’s student in the International Security program at George Mason University. She holds a bachelor’s degree in international Affairs and Political Science from the Elliott School of International Affairs at The George Washington University and currently works in private security consulting. Her academic and professional interests include transnational organized crime, terrorism, and regional instability in Latin America, as well as evolving security dynamics in Eastern Asia.
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