The world has once again witnessed a conflict between India and Pakistan, following recent terror attacks of Pahalgam Valley of Indian-administered Kashmir. New Delhi swiftly accused Pakistan of supporting these attacks, a claim that Islamabad denied. In a sharp response, India announced the suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), a decades-old water-sharing agreement that has historically endured through wars and political crises. This decision reflects a deeper issue: water, once a symbol of cooperation, is now increasingly weaponized as a tool of coercion.
The water-related tensions, fueled by competing infrastructure ambitions, climate pressures, and unresolved treaty limitations, now pose a growing risk to peace and stability in South Asia. As both countries try to expand their control over transboundary rivers, the politicization and weaponization of water between two nuclear-armed states raises urgent questions about the future of conflict and cooperation in the subcontinent.
The IWT, signed in 1960 with the mediation of the World Bank, divided the Indus River System between the two nations: India received full rights over the Eastern Rivers (Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej), while Pakistan was granted rights over the Western Rivers (Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab). While the treaty has survived multiple wars (1965, 1971, 1999) and periods of intense hostility, its durability is now being tested by new geopolitical realities.
What makes the situation more dangerous is the declining efficacy of the IWT’s conflict resolution mechanisms. As per Article IX of the treaty, disputes are to be first addressed by the Permanent Indus Commission, and if unresolved, escalated to a Neutral Expert or even an international court. However, in recent years, the mechanism has been mired in procedural delays and mutual distrust. India has questioned the neutrality of international arbitrators, while Pakistan has expressed frustration over India’s unilateral moves. The system appears increasingly unable to manage the complex, fast-evolving nature of the dispute.
Furthermore, the treaty contains no provisions to address contemporary environmental challenges such as glacial melting, changing rainfall patterns, and sedimentation. According to reports, in the transboundary Indus River Basin, climate change is expected to reduce streamflow significantly by the end of the century, placing growing stress on existing water-sharing agreements both between countries and within subnational administrative regions. These environmental factors are likely to deteriorate existing tensions between India and Pakistan, as both countries depend heavily on stable and predictable river systems for agriculture, energy, and human consumption.
Over the years, India has repeatedly claimed that Pakistan is misusing the treaty to obstruct its legitimate hydropower development. In 2023, India formally requested the modification of the treaty, expressing dissatisfaction with its current provisions and the functioning of the Permanent Indus Commission.
Following recent attacks, Indian officials have emphasized a multi-phase approach to water management, outlining short, medium, and long-term infrastructure plans on the Western Rivers. While India maintains that its recent dam construction and hydraulic infrastructure projects on the Western Rivers are consistent with the technical provisions of the IWT, Pakistan argues that these developments are in violation of the treaty and threaten its guaranteed water allocations. Pakistan contends that India’s cumulative infrastructure development, including the Kishanganga and Ratle dams, allows it to manipulate downstream flows, thereby threatening Pakistan’s food and water security.
India’s infrastructure is not yet capable of fully diverting or halting flows to Pakistan. However, the long-term implications of projects that enhance India’s control over river flows will be more and more profound. Such developments could significantly heighten regional instability, particularly as Pakistan has repeatedly warned that any attempt to block or significantly restrict water flows could be considered an act of war.
The stakes for Pakistan are particularly high. Nearly 70–80% of Pakistan’s irrigated land depends on the Indus River system, which provides water for over 80% of the country’s food production and supports the livelihoods of millions. Agriculture represents nearly 23% of GDP, contributing over 24% of national exports, and employing more than a third of the labor force. Disruptions to this system, whether seasonal or strategic, could have catastrophic consequences for food security, rural livelihoods, and economic stability. Beyond agriculture, Pakistan’s energy sector is also vulnerable: more than 20% of the country’s electricity is generated through hydropower, and almost all its hydroelectric plants are located within the Indus Basin.
The restriction of water also presents a severe internal challenge for Pakistan. Water insecurity is not only a geopolitical issue but also a critical domestic vulnerability. Pakistan’s water crisis is compounded by internal political fragmentation, poor governance, and competing provincial interests. These structural weaknesses threaten to turn external water pressures into domestic instability, as regions and sectors within Pakistan struggle over scarce water resources.
In conclusion, water security is no longer a peripheral issue in the Kashmir conflict. The IWT, once praised as a model of transboundary water cooperation, is showing its age and fragility. The treaty’s ineffective dispute resolution mechanisms, and inability to adapt to new environmental and geopolitical realities render it insufficient for present and future needs. Therefore, unless constructive diplomatic mechanisms are initiated or international mediators like the United States become involved, the weaponization of water is likely to escalate, with dire consequences for regional peace and security.
Aydin Guven is a PhD student in Political Science at George Mason University’s Schar School of Policy and Government, majoring in International Relations and Comparative Politics. He holds a M.A. in International Relations from Istanbul Medeniyet University. His academic interests are Asia/Indo-Pacific security, South Asian Politics, India’s role in the US-China power competition, India’s East Asia Policy.
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