Since 2007 when a Russian submersible planted a ceremonial Russian flag on the North Pole seabed, Russia has increased its military presence in the Arctic in various ways, provoking similar responses by the United States and North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The Arctic has always been important to Russia because it not only forms a core part of Russian national identity and serves as an economic resource base, but it is also perceived by Russia to be a critical area for its defense capabilities. Russia’s increased military presence in the Arctic is motivated by security concerns primarily stemming from two factors. The first factor is Russia’s perception of needing to strengthen its self-defense capabilities. The second factor is maintaining Russia’s regional hegemony against what it perceives as threatening efforts by the U.S. and NATO to contain its influence in a strategically important region to Russia. However, the implications of Russia’s actions and the reactions by the U.S. and NATO have the potential to threaten future Arctic security and stability.
The Arctic plays a significant role in Russia’s self-identity as a great power because Russia has historically perceived the Arctic to largely belong in its sphere of influence and because Russia boasts regional hegemony in the area. Russia’s security posture aims to maintain Russia’s sphere of influence to safeguard it against external threats, particularly in areas of strategic importance such as the Arctic. While the U.S. is by far the most powerful Arctic state, its limited presence in the Arctic has granted Russia de-facto hegemony in the region. In terms of the greatest capabilities deployed in the region and the fact that Russia has the largest Arctic fleet capable of year-round power projection, Russia is the commanding military power. However, Russia has increasingly perceived the U.S. and NATO as trying to reduce and replace its influence in its historic sphere of influence.
Over the last few decades, Russia has sought to increase its military presence and capabilities in the Arctic to demonstrate and maintain Russia’s power in the region as well as convey it to the U.S. and NATO. Russia has both re-opened former Soviet military and radar bases on and around its northern coastline and has built new ones to boast a total of twenty-seven bases above the Arctic Circle. Additionally, Russia intends to add an additional twenty-two icebreakers to its existing fleet of fifty-five which will significantly increase its already strong year-round power projection capabilities in the Arctic. Meanwhile, the U.S. and NATO have responded to Russia’s “aggressive” behavior in the Arctic by building up their own military presences and military capabilities in the region. The U.S intends to build six new icebreakers for the Coast Guard to replace the two in its fleet to better maintain a persistent presence in the region year-round and has reopened the Keflavik Naval Air Station in Iceland where it now stations a bomber task force mission for “strategic deterrence.” NATO has taken similar actions in response to Russia’s expanding military presence by taking steps such as increasing its exercise and training tempo in the region to “show the world that NATO is relevant, united, and ready to defend itself”.
One implication of Russia’s actions in the Arctic involves the continuation of suspicion and mistrust between Russia and the U.S./NATO in the future, especially considering Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. The U.S. and NATO may reasonably continue to view Russia’s actions in the Arctic with heightened suspicion and increase their own respective military presences and capabilities in the Arctic to bolster their own self-defense capacities. The current perspectives of each side viewing the other as presenting a potential security threat leads to continuing cycles of mutual distrust and uncertainty between Russia and the U.S./NATO in the Arctic. Geopolitical tensions and suspicions will continue to increase as this cycle continues, which may result in a destabilizing and increasingly offensive posture in the region. U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin has cited “the importance of maintaining lines of communication [with Russia] amid the ongoing war” in Ukraine. Maintaining open diplomatic and military lines of communication between the U.S. and Moscow on Arctic matters may be one way to help minimize misperceptions by either country in the Arctic to help reduce tensions or avoid misperceptions that could lead to accidental escalation.
Furthermore, the outcome of Russia’s war in Ukraine bears the potential to influence future security and stability in the Arctic regarding Russia’s future on the Arctic Council. Composed of the eight Arctic states (the U.S., Canada, Denmark, Norway, and Russia, Finland, Iceland, and Sweden), the Council is a consensus-based intergovernmental forum designed to facilitate cooperation and collaboration on Arctic concerns and which thereby contributes to stability in the region. As a response to the onset of Russia’s invasion to Ukraine, the seven other members of the Council (the “Arctic 7”) suspended political activities and high-level meetings. While projects that did not involve Russia resumed as early as the summer of 2022, this decision has pushed back the progress of inter-Arctic dialogue and cooperation. Regardless of whether Russia should win or lose the war in Ukraine, the Arctic 7 may seek the eventual re-normalization of Russia into Council activities to resume full-scale Arctic coordination and cooperation. The Arctic 7 may reluctantly prefer this option over the continued isolation of the largest Arctic state, which would undermine the fundamental vision of circumpolar cooperation that prompted the Council’s creation in the first place.
The Arctic remains an evolving arena for geopolitical competition between Russia and the U.S. and its Arctic NATO allies, particularly as tensions have increased following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. To help mitigate risks and preserve stability in the Arctic, Russia and the U.S., along with the rest of the Arctic 7 countries, must take care to ensure that increased human activity and military capabilities in the region do not lead to accidental or inadvertent escalation caused by miscommunication or misinterpretation of each other’s actions. Despite the ongoing war in Ukraine, maintaining lines of diplomatic and military communication with Russia on Arctic matters and re-normalizing Russia’s participation on the Arctic Council to help bolster Arctic cooperation and stability may be effective methods to help do so.
Abby Bell is a M.A. student in the International Security program with the Schar School of Policy and Government at George Mason University. She holds a B.A. in Global Studies with concentrations in international politics and Latin America and minors in Spanish and geography from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Prior to attending graduate school, Abby worked as a federal contractor with the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. She also has experience in the non-profit sector and has lived and worked in Ecuador and Spain. Her academic and research interests include grand strategy, U.S. foreign policy and national security, and international security. After graduating, Abby hopes to pursue a career in foreign policy and national security.
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