

CONFERENCE REPORT:

2024 CSPS-Korea International Security Symposium

The Role of Korea in the Evolving Indo-Pacific Security Dynamics

인도-태평양 안보환경 변화와 한국의 역할

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Center for Security Policy Studies
at George Mason University



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2024 CSPA-Korea International Security Symposium
The Role of Korea in the Evolving Indo-Pacific Security Dynamics

I. About CSPA-Korea and International Security Symposium

The Center for Security Policy Studies (CSPA) of the Schar School of Policy and Government advances the study of international security. Through its research and extensive array of student programs, CSPA seeks to generate solutions to today's pressing security challenges and educate tomorrow's security policymakers. Located on Mason's Arlington campus, CSPA provides unique access to defense and security experts, government officers, prominent think tank analysts and renowned scholars.

Launched in 2019 as the satellite institute of CSPA Arlington, CSPA-Korea aims to facilitate research collaboration and academic exchange with the main campus. CSPA-Korea, being based near Seoul, the capital city of the Republic of Korea, enables the institute to leverage its location to liaise the policy world of the United States and Asia, and provide diversified perspectives on security issues that warrant global attention. CSPA-Korea recognizes the necessity to address the non-traditional security issues of climate change, pandemics, demographic shifts, human rights issues, and refugee crises. CSPA-Korea thus convenes an annual spring symposium in collaboration with think tanks, international organizations, as well as non-governmental organizations to discuss today's security challenges and to deduce policy implications that would potentially serve as policy options and solutions.

The year 2024 marks the 10th anniversary of George Mason University Korea (Mason Korea) and the 5th of CSPA-Korea. Since its establishment in 2014, Mason Korea has upheld the institutional framework and values of its home campus in the U.S., promoting the Mason's mission of fomenting an innovative and inclusive academic environment for a more just, free, and prosperous world. Just as Mason Korea bridges borders of the U.S. and Korea, CSPA-Korea connects the fields of security studies and foreign policy between the two countries through research collaboration. Through partnership and collaboration with governments, think tanks, and research institutions, the CSPA-Korea has successfully accomplished multiple events, research projects, and publications on a wide range of topics, including environmental security, human security, the U.S.-ROK alliance, and artificial intelligence and technology partnership.

This year's symposium titled, "The Role of Korea in the Evolving Indo-Pacific Security Dynamics," offers an open platform for discussions on the changing security landscape in the Indo-Pacific region, driven by great power rivalry, and the role of Korea as a middle power. Scholars and practitioners with expertise in the regional politics and diplomatic relations between the U.S., Korea, and China are invited to share their insights and experience. They will discuss ways to develop a future-oriented outlook that can enhance peace and security in the Indo-Pacific.

History of CSPA-Korea International Security Symposia

2018: *Issues and Concerns in Security Studies: Beyond Asia*

2019: *International Security: Environmental Challenges and Solutions*

2021: *Human Security in the Gray Zone: North Korean Defectors and Their Children*

2022: *Prospects for Peace on the Korean Peninsula in Northeast Asia's Changing Security Landscape*

2023: *The Challenges of New Technologies and the Future of U.S.-ROK Alliance*

2024: *The Role of Korea in the Evolving Indo-Pacific Security Dynamics*

II. Program Agenda

12:30-12:50	Registration
Opening Session	
13:00-13:40	Welcome Remarks Dr. Gregory Washington , President of George Mason University Opening Remarks Dr. Robert Matz , Campus Dean of George Mason University Korea Dr. Mark Rozell , Dean of Schar School of Policy and Government, George Mason University Congratulatory Remarks General Michael V. Hayden , Founder of The Michael V. Hayden Center for Intelligence, Policy, and International Security, George Mason University James Kim , Chairman & CEO of The American Chamber of Commerce in Korea Concept Note Speech: “Overview of the Indo-Pacific Security Challenges” Dr. Soyoung Kwon , Director of Center for Security Policy Studies-Korea, George Mason University Korea
Session 1: Changing Security Dynamics in the Indo-Pacific and Challenges	
13:40-15:10	Presentations <ul style="list-style-type: none">• “Maintaining Strategic Stability in the U.S.-China Rivalry” Dr. Chaesung Chun, Seoul National University• “Great Power Rivalry and China’s Response” Dr. Ketian Zhang, Schar School of Policy and Government, George Mason University• “A South Korean Perspective on the U.S.-led Security Network in the Indo-Pacific” Dr. Jae Jeok Park, Yonsei University• “Reputation or Reliability? Washington’s Options in a Taiwan Crisis” Dr. Michael Hunzeker, Schar School of Policy and Government, George Mason University Panel Discussion Moderated by Dr. Michael Hunzeker , Schar School of Policy and Government, George Mason University
15:10-15:30	Coffee Break and Networking
Session 2: South Korea’s Contributions as a Middle Power to Regional Security	
15:30-16:45	Remarks <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Ambassador Kathleen Stephens, Former Ambassador of the U.S. to Korea• Ambassador Ho-Young Ahn, Former Ambassador of Korea to the U.S.• Ambassador Jung-Seung Shin, Former Ambassador of Korea to China Panel Discussion Moderated by Prof. Ellen Laipson , Director of Center for Security Policy Studies, George Mason University
Closing	
16:45-17:00	Closing Remarks Prof. Ellen Laipson , Director of Center for Security Policy Studies, George Mason University

III. A Conceptual Note: “Overview of the Indo-Pacific Security Challenges”



Dr. Soyoung Kwon

Director, Center for Security Policy Studies-Korea, George Mason University

The Main Theme of the Symposium

This year, CSPPS-Korea invited the U.S. perspective on Korea’s security and foreign policy at this critical time of rapidly changing security dynamics in the Indo-Pacific region. There are three thematic focuses: 1) the evolving security landscape, including shifts in alliances and emerging threats in the Indo-Pacific region; 2) South Korea’s role as a middle power state and its contributions to regional and global security; and 3) areas for coordinated diplomatic and public policy efforts to promote regional security.

Security Challenges in the Indo-Pacific Region

The Indo-Pacific region faces many significant security challenges, ranging from traditional military threats to non-traditional security issues. These challenges include: 1) numerous territorial disputes, particularly in the South China Sea, East China Sea, and the Indian Ocean; 2) security threats of maritime trade routes in the Indo-Pacific; 3) cybersecurity threats by cyberattacks, espionage, sabotage, and data breaches; 4) environmental challenges such as climate change, natural disasters, and environmental degradation; 5) North Korea’s nuclear weapons program and ballistic missile tests; 6) military modernization efforts using AI and a regional arms race based on the proliferation of advanced military technologies.

While these problems raise some concerns about regional stability, a more grave concern is the rising tensions and conflicts exacerbated by the intensifying U.S.-China competition. The Indo-Pacific region has become a focal point for the competition between the U.S. and China due to the region's geopolitical, economic, and strategic importance. China attempts to establish hegemony through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and its assertive actions in the South China Sea, while the U.S. aims to maintain its economic influence through trade agreements and investment partnerships. In terms of military posturing, the U.S. has been strengthening its military alliances and partnerships, while China has been modernizing its military and claiming its maritime expansion in the East and South China Sea. The region's security trouble spots, such as the Taiwan Strait, South China Sea, and Korean Peninsula, warrant attention as the tension between U.S.-China in military realm may escalate and destabilize the region and beyond.

The competition between the U.S. and China extends beyond geopolitics and economics to include a contest of values and norms. The resurgence of normative competition is rekindling the Cold War-era divide in the region, aligning South Korea, the U.S., and Japan against North Korea, China, and Russia. This normative competition between democratic liberalism and authoritarianism influences governance structures and political dynamics in the region as countries grapple with competing visions of order and development. The trend also significantly impacts the alliance dynamics. Many countries are hedging their bets by balancing their relationships between the two powers, while others are aligning more closely with the U.S. to counter China's growing influence as evidenced by the multilateral security arrangements in QUAD and AUKUS. The U.S.-China competition in the Indo-Pacific is reshaping the global balance of power, with far-reaching implications for the future of international relations and the world order.

South Korea as a Pivotal Middle Power

The increasing prominence and influence of middle powers in the international system present an opportunity in the changing security paradigm. A pivotal middle power refers to a country with significant influence and a critical role in global or regional affairs with its substantial economic, political, and diplomatic capabilities. The pivotal middle powers can exert influence beyond their immediate geographic boundaries and even to the world's most powerful nations with their significant economic resources, diplomatic influence, and strategic positioning. These pivotal middle powers, therefore, can play a crucial role in fostering cooperation, stability, and prosperity in an increasingly interconnected and multipolar world.

South Korea has become a recognized middle power capable of utilizing its status to exert influence globally, and therefore, is situated in a position where it can develop unique foreign relations and diplomatic strategies. As one of the pivotal middle powers, South Korea possesses the capacity and resources to effectively address regional security concerns through diplomatic efforts outside the field of play for the great powers. Yet, South Korea's role seems to be constrained within the volatile regional security landscape and great power competition dynamics. The envisioned status of South Korea as a "Global Pivotal State" has yet to be materialized into a clearly defined role and consistent action plan. It is imperative to explore and mark South Korea's optimal role as a middle power and balancer in light of these changing geopolitical circumstances.

Symposium Focus and Objective

The Symposium provided a comprehensive analysis of the latest developments in the Indo-Pacific region and tackled contemporary challenges and opportunities. Emphasizing the global nature of security challenges, discussions on international relations, alliances, and diplomatic strategies remain pertinent in the context of South Korea's role as a key player and pivotal middle power.

The Symposium had two distinct sessions. The first session adopted a conceptual, analytical, and scholarly approach to the critical Indo-Pacific security challenges and security trouble spots. We invited distinguished scholars and experts from the United States and South Korea to present their respective perspectives and diagnoses on the changing security dynamics in the Indo-Pacific. This session aims to illustrate geopolitical shifts and evolving alliances, underlining major player's strategies and intent.

The second session set a more pragmatic, experiential, and policy-centric tone in discussing South Korea's role amidst the region's prevailing security challenges. A panel of former U.S. and South Korean ambassadors engaged in open discussions to offer strategic advice on South Korea's position in the great power rivalry. The session focused on the questions of what role South Korea can play as a pivotal middle power to tackle major security challenges in the Indo-Pacific region and how South Korea can find a good balance between the two great powers based on a consistent grand strategy.

IV. Session 1: Changing Security Dynamics in the Indo-Pacific and Challenges

13:40-15:10

Presentations

- **“Maintaining Strategic Stability in the U.S.-China Rivalry”**
Dr. Chaesung Chun, Seoul National University
- **“Great Power Rivalry and China’s Response”**
Dr. Ketian Zhang, George Mason University
- **“A South Korean Perspective on the U.S.-led Security Network in the Indo-Pacific”**
Dr. Jae Jeok Park, Yonsei University
- **“Reputation or Reliability? Washington’s Options in a Taiwan Crisis”**
Dr. Michael Hunzeker, George Mason University

Panel Discussion

- Moderated by Dr. Michael Hunzeker, George Mason University



This session, titled “Changing Security Dynamics in the Indo-Pacific and Challenges,” invited scholars in the field to set an analytical and conceptual framework through which the evolving security dynamics in the Indo-Pacific region were explored with a focus on the strategic interactions between major powers and their implications for regional stability. Discussions covered the necessity of maintaining a military balance to prevent conflicts, the strategic objectives and responses of key nations, and the role of security networks and alliances. The session examined the potential impact of U.S. decisions in crises involving Taiwan on its credibility and reliability in the region. Emphasis was placed on understanding how these dynamics influence the broader geopolitical landscape and the challenges they present to maintaining peace and stability.

Session 1-1:

“Maintaining Strategic Stability in the U.S.-China Rivalry”



Dr. Chaesung Chun,
Professor, Seoul National University

As is widely known, the Indo-Pacific is a relatively new concept, first suggested by the former Prime Minister of Japan, Abe, and subsequently embraced by former President Trump in 2017 at the Hanoi Summit. Following this, numerous countries have issued reports concerning Indo-Pacific strategy. The fundamental idea posits that the Indian Ocean and Pacific Ocean are interconnected in terms of security and economic interests. However, underlying this notion is a motivation to balance against the rising influence of China, which is perceived by Western powers and certain American and Asian powers as a revisionist power intent on altering the status quo through military strength.

Globally, there is an evident breach of basic principles of the liberal security order, most prominently demonstrated in the case of the Ukraine war. Additionally, there are emerging security challenges in the Middle East. Hence, it is imperative to conceptualize the security order in the context of the liberal international order, more specifically the international liberal security order. The liberal order comprises three main components: liberal security order, liberal economic order, and liberal value ideational order.

The current situation represents an inflection point: whether the liberal security order will evolve into a more robust system or decay remains to be seen. Key principles of the liberal order must be emphasized. The liberal order is not a globally democratic system, as voices from smaller countries, such as those in the Global South, are often not adequately reflected in international relations. The structure of organizations like the United Nations Security Council, dominated by great powers, exemplifies this imbalance.

There is a need for greater accountability among these great powers. Without it, the liberal order risks being perceived merely as a construct of the victorious powers of World War II. The authority of the United Nations has significantly weakened following events like Russia's invasion of Ukraine, which undermines the credibility of the liberal order. Consequently, there should be mechanisms to ensure the accountability of great powers to maintain a liberal security order that could also be seen as democratic.

If these issues are not addressed, more voices from the Global South and middle powers will likely challenge the legitimacy of the liberal order. Although the U.S.-led rule-based liberal order has reflected a multitude of perspectives from various countries, multilateral institutions have buttressed its foundation. However, in the Pacific region, the critical question is whether it can serve as the bedrock for the future evolution of the liberal security order.

The realist perspective views the Indo-Pacific as a region of U.S.-China rivalry. However, from a liberal perspective, the potential exists to build a better liberal security order based on new principles and cooperation among democratic powers, and even by engaging China on mutual interests such as transnational threats like environmental crises. The Indo-Pacific security architecture, therefore, must be emphasized.

The national interests of many Asian powers, which maintain close economic relations with China, further complicate this scenario. Although China is the primary trade partner for many, there is apprehension regarding China's more aggressive and assertive revisionist security behavior. Economic interdependence creates a complex decision-making landscape for these countries.

The U.S.'s increasingly confrontational stance towards China impacts the strategic choices of Asian powers, including U.S. allies. Institutional and normative challenges persist under U.S. leadership, maintaining a hub-and-spoke security alliance system. As multilateral security cooperations, such as those involving the U.S., South Korea, and Japan, become more prevalent, the Chinese perspective on U.S.-China relations diverges significantly.

The Chinese leadership does not endorse the concept of rivalry, emphasizing cooperative and peaceful coexistence. Thus, the differing interpretations of U.S.-China relations create a lack of consensus, complicating strategic stability. Historically, both China and South Korea have experienced incomplete sovereign transitions due to division, influencing their contemporary security strategies.

The pursuit of unifying Taiwan, from China's perspective, represents a return to the status quo rather than an aggressive mission, though it is perceived as aggressive by other powers. This disparity in understanding underscores the need for comprehensive engagement and dialogue.

In conclusion, the evolving military balance, influenced by advancements in military technologies, especially in areas like quantum computing and artificial intelligence, raises concerns about future shifts in strategic power. The ongoing developments necessitate a nuanced and collaborative approach to maintaining regional and global security.

Changing Security Dynamics and the Indo-Pacific and Challenges

Chaesung Chun
Seoul National University

2024 CSPS-K Annual Symposium on
"The Role of Korea in the Evolving Indo-Pacific Security Dynamics."

2024. 6. 14.

Liberal International Order and Liberal Security Order

- Since 1945, the US-led international liberal order now faces fundamental inflection point: **evolution or decay?**
- The normative basis of a liberal security order
 - Respect for the **sovereignty** of all states: territorial integrity, non-alteration of borders, non-interference in internal affairs
 - Normative and **rule-based** resolution of security conflicts
 - **Crisis management**
- Importance of the United Nations and **international law**
- **Multilateral** institutional solutions to security problems
- The **liberal and democratic** nature of multilateral institutions
- **Accountability** issues in great power politics
- Relationship with **democratic peace** theory

Indo-Pacific as the bedrock of future international liberal security order

- US-China Rivalry
 - Key area for global **economy** and future economic development.
 - **Strategic decoupling** is occurring, making the Indo-Pacific crucial in US-China competition.
- Diverging National Interests
 - Varying perspectives on security and cooperation (e.g., India, Japan, Australia)
 - **mixed approaches** to engaging with China
- Institutional and Normative Challenges
 - Future of US-led hub-and-spokes system: **modernization of alliance system, inter-spoke cooperation**
 - Emerging **minilateral** groupings (QUAD, AUKUS) and their uncertain effectiveness

US-China Rivalry and Lack of Strategic Consensus

- Concept of "strategic consensus"
- China's Sovereignty Challenges
 - **Incomplete Sovereignty**
 - Since the 19th century, China has not achieved full sovereignty.
 - Issues include Taiwan and South China Sea disputes.
- US Strategy and Military Balance
 - **Integrated Deterrence Strategy**
 - Focus on military development, alliance strengthening, and new military technologies.
 - Prevent China from creating crises through **military coercion**.

The US Strategy toward China

- **Not a New Cold War** Strategy
 - The US does not aim to defeat China through **ideological** confrontation.
 - Emphasis on **Mutual Dependence**
 - Importance of economic interdependence and common prosperity.
- Lack of Clear **Ultimate** Goal
 - No definitive end-state for US strategy towards China: "**Steady state**"
 - Continuous and **phased approaches** to observe China's changes.
- Maintaining Military Balance
 - Crucial to prevent China from creating crises.
 - Aim to induce China to act according to international norms.
 - Arms control, on **nuclear** and **AI-based** military power

Challenges for South Korea

- Maintaining the Liberal Security Order
 - How to sustain the **liberal security order** in the future global security landscape, especially in the Indo-Pacific region. Close connections with **Europe** and other regions are crucial for a global liberal security order.
- Challenges for South Korea's **Alliance Status**
 - Potential for **Hierarchy** Emergence: As East Asian ally and partner nations coalesce, the potential for hierarchy among US allies increases.
 - Preventing Competition: Need to strengthen cooperation and prevent **competition among allies**.
- How to maintain security stability and economic development based on **South Korea-China** relations
 - Importance of multilateral cooperation with **like-minded, like-situated** countries, and **rules-based** diplomacy
- Capabilities of South Korea
 - **Military** power and defense industry. / Potential in new **technologies**. / **Economic** strength. / Diplomatic and **cultural** influence.

Some Areas of security cooperation

Maritime Security

- South Korea's role in protecting sea routes from the Middle East to Northeast Asia.
- Explore cooperation with Southeast Asian countries for South China Sea stabilization
- Develop an Indo-Pacific strategy for economic and human development in Southeast Asia.
- Establish new crisis management mechanisms and protocols to prevent maritime incidents and reduce tensions.

Indo-Pacific Nuclear Order Initiative

- Non-proliferation in this region, and arms control among the US, China, and Russia.
- Develop US extended deterrence for South Korea and refine the nuclear consultation group.
- Engage in joint strategic dialogue on North Korea's denuclearization roadmap.
- Facilitate trilateral dialogue among South Korea, the US, and China on North Korea's denuclearization.

Military Supply Chain Initiative

- Multilateral mechanisms such as South Korea's participation in AUKUS Pillar 2.
- Strengthen cooperation with like-minded countries for technology transfer and localization, especially for new technologies.
- Utilization of South Korea's advanced manufacturing capabilities in semiconductors and advanced industries, including the production of key components for weapon systems and munitions.

Session 1-2:

“Great Power Rivalry and China’s Response”



Dr. Ketian Zhang,

Professor, George Mason University

China’s core interests have been relatively clearly articulated by the Chinese Communist Party, highlighting the hierarchy of national interests in a 2010 document by former State Councilor Dai Bingguo. These core interests include regime security, social development, economic order, technological advancement, and territorial integrity, particularly regarding Taiwan and Tibet. Additionally, China places importance on non-traditional security issues such as nuclear non-proliferation, stability on the Korean Peninsula, energy security, counterterrorism, and responses to global pandemics.

In order to achieve these strategic goals, China employs a combination of coercive and economic measures. Coercion, defined as the use or threat of negative actions to demand changes in behavior, has been on the rise over the past three decades. The data collected from 1990 to 2020, as presented in a recent publication with Cambridge University Press, indicates a significant increase in China’s coercive actions. However, there has been a notable shift towards non-militarized forms of coercion in recent years to avoid escalation into major military confrontations, particularly involving the United States.

Examples of non-militarized coercion include economic sanctions, such as the banana ban against the Philippines in response to maritime territorial disputes in the South China Sea, and the use of civilian law enforcement to inflict physical damage on Vietnamese vessels. Additionally, China has employed economic statecraft to influence other states, utilizing economic incentives and strategic partnerships rather than formal alliances.

China tends to prefer non-militarized coercion to avoid major confrontations and strategically selects its targets based on the potential impact on its reputation and resolve. This strategic calculation is evident in the frequent coercive actions against the Philippines compared to Malaysia, driven by the perceived higher media attention and impact on China's standing.

A significant aspect of China's foreign relations is the economic component embedded in all its partnerships. Evidence of this is found in the extensive network of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and free trade agreements (FTAs) that China has established. Approximately 85 percent of China's partnership countries have signed BITs with China, while 11 out of the 14 FTAs China has signed are with these same partnership countries. This extensive economic integration reflects China's strategic use of economic agreements to solidify alliances and expand its global influence.

Moreover, China's security cooperation with certain partnership countries often involves arms transfers, which are driven by economic motivations. This blend of security and economic incentives highlights the dual-purpose nature of China's international engagements. Additionally, China practices 'oil diplomacy' with resource-rich countries, securing energy supplies crucial for sustaining its economic growth.

China's approach can be viewed as a 'Goldilocks choice,' where it carefully balances the need to establish strategic resolve with the economic costs involved. In the context of a globalized economy, this balancing act provides both opportunities and constraints for China. On one hand, economic interdependence offers China leverage over its partners; on the other hand, it exposes China to global economic fluctuations and the repercussions of coercive policies.

The implications for the United States and its allies are multifaceted. A quiet rebalancing is necessary, involving more frequent and regularized Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs). Additionally, targeted economic leverage can be exerted by keeping China integrated within the global production and supply chain. Providing more attractive economic alternatives for less developed countries will also be crucial.

Great Power Rivalry and China's Response

Ketian Zhang, Ph.D.

Assistant Professor, George Mason University

Structure of the Presentation


- China's grand strategic goals
- China's actions: carrots and sticks
- Policy implications for the United States and US allies in the Indo-Pacific region

China's Grand Strategic Goals

- Core interests as laid out by Dai Bingguo
 - **Survival of the CCP: regime security**
 - Basic social and economic order
 - Economic development (and tech dev)
 - Territorial integrity: Tibet and Taiwan esp.
- Important security interests
 - Territorial disputes in SCS and ECS, Sino-Indian border
 - Nuclear non-proliferation and the Korean Peninsula
 - Counter-terrorism
 - Non-traditional security issues, e.g., energy security


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China's Actions: Carrots and Sticks




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How Does China Coerce



5

Who Does China Coerce



Source: Internal Map from the Chinese Academy of Sciences

7

Carrots: China's Economic Statecraft



Source: MOFCOM

8

Only 31% of the countries have a military component in their partnership agreement with China

Table 2. Countries Whose Partnership Agreements with China Have a Military/Security Component

Partnership categories	Percent/Countries
Comprehensive strategic coordinated partnership	100% (Russia)
All-weather category partnerships	75% (Belarus, Pakistan, Uzbekistan)
Comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership	26% (Cambodia; Laos; Mozambique; Gabon; DRC)
Comprehensive strategic partnership	35% (Kazakhstan; Malaysia; Egypt; Saudi Arabia; Iran; Serbia; Hungary; Tajikistan; South Africa; Kyrgyzstan; UAE; Turkmenistan; Timor-Leste)
Strategic cooperative partnership	56% (India; Sri Lanka; Afghanistan; Brunei; Bangladesh)
Strategic partnership	19% (Qatar; Jordan; Morocco; Sudan)
Comprehensive cooperative partnership	15% (Romania; Equatorial Guinea)

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All of China's Partnerships Have an Economic Component

- 85% of China's partnership countries have signed bilateral investment treaties (BIT) with China.
- Of the 14 FTAs that China has signed, 11 of them are with China's partnership countries.
- China's security cooperation with some partnership countries mainly exists in the form of arms transfer, which in and of itself has an economic motivation.
- China practices 'oil diplomacy' with some partnership countries rich in natural resources.

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Conclusions and Implications

- **Goldilocks choice:** China balances between the need to establish resolve and economic cost
 - A globalized economy provides both opportunities and constraints for rising powers such as China's coercive behavior
- Implications for the United States and its allies:
 - Quiet rebalancing: More frequent and regularized FONOPs
 - Targeted economic leverage by keeping China in the global production and supply chain
 - More attractive economic alternatives for less developed countries

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Session 1-3:

“A South Korean Perspective on the U.S.-led Security Network in the Indo-Pacific”



Dr. Jae Jeok Park,
Professor, Yonsei University

John Ikenberry, a renowned scholar in international relations, known for his work on institutionalism, provides a useful framework. He posits that if the 21st-century geopolitical competition is solely between China and the United States, China has an advantage. However, if this competition includes the broader West—comprising the United States and European states—the West holds the upper hand. This viewpoint aligns with the current South Korean government’s perspective on the China-U.S. rivalry.

The United States maintains a robust security network that includes allies like South Korea, Japan, the Philippines, Thailand, and Australia. Recently, this network has been expanding to incorporate European states such as the UK and France, reflecting its global reach across both the Asia-Pacific and Europe.

NATO has invited South Korea, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand to its summit meetings over the past two years. The UK and Japan have signed a reciprocal access agreement allowing large-scale military exercises, and Japan is negotiating a similar agreement with France. Additionally, trilateral cooperation among India, Australia, and France aims to oversee the Indian Ocean region.

South Korea is enhancing its role within the U.S.-led security network and committing to regional security issues. The U.S. and European states use regional security as a rationale for engaging with Asia-Pacific states. For instance, the Quad announced the launch of a working group on Indo-Pacific Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA) in the Pacific in 2022, and the EU is working on projects to enhance maritime domain awareness in the region.

Increased security cooperation between the U.S., Japan, the Philippines, and Australia, informally dubbed “Quad,” involves conducting military exercises and maritime patrols. This cooperation has significant implications for territorial disputes in Southeast Asia and potential contingencies near the Taiwan Strait. South Korea is also asserting its commitment to maritime security in the region. The previous administration emphasized this to bolster the U.S.-Korea Alliance. The current government aims to enhance South Korea’s positional power within the U.S.-led security network and strengthen ties with Southeast Asian states, which have become crucial given South Korea’s declining population.

To increase maritime visibility, South Korea could collaborate with Vietnam, which has recently conducted maritime patrols with China. This partnership could help South Korea gain a stronger presence in the South China Sea. Additionally, South Korea could offer maritime capacity-building assistance to regional states, leveraging its advanced satellite capabilities.

In Northeast Asia, security cooperation among South Korea, Japan, and the U.S. has intensified. The three countries have established the Nuclear Consultation Group (NCG) to bolster the credibility of the extended deterrence provided by the United States. However, some U.S. think tank analysts suggest that a potential return of Trump could lead South Korea to reconsider its stance on nuclear capabilities or even become a nuclear-latent state.

South Korea’s Indo-Pacific Strategy clearly outlines a strong commitment to middle power-oriented minilateralism. With the restoration of South Korea-Japan and South Korea-Japan-U.S. security cooperation in 2023, South Korea, Japan, and Australia need to seek ways to work together in ASEAN and in the Pacific as well as in Northeast Asia. South Korea should consider improving trilateral cooperation with Australia and Indonesia (KIA: Korea, India, Australia) as part of its Indo-Pacific strategy. This trilateral could be expanded to include the Philippines and Vietnam, which are highly interested in defense industry and energy cooperation with South Korea.

Changing Security Dynamics in the Indo-Pacific and Challenges:

A South Korean Perspective

Jae Jeok Park (Yonsei University)

(2024.6.14)

China vs. West

○ South Korea is approaching the geopolitical struggle in the Indo-Pacific as a competition between China and the broader West and intends to enhance its security cooperation with the latter.

→ Ex) NATO+AP4

AUKUS

Japan-UK Reciprocal Access Agreement

Trilateral among India, Australia and France

→ South Korea's Indo-Pacific strategy defines the geographical boundary of the region to include French and British territories in the Indian Ocean.

Maritime Security

O During the third Quad summit meeting in 2022, members agreed to launch the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA).

O The EU has also been interested in MDA in the Indo-Pacific.

➔ The EU conducted the Critical Maritime Routes Indo-Pacific (CRIMARIO) Project I between 2015 and 2019.

➔ The EU has been now undertaking CRIMARIO II (May 2020-April 2025)

O The US-Japan-the Philippines(-Australia) Maritime Cooperation Activity

O South Korea has been increasing its contribution to marine capacity building and marine domain awareness in the region.

➔ The current government approaches maritime security from the angle of South Korea's pursuit of a 'global pivotal power' rather than accommodating US strategic interests in the Indo-Pacific to insure the US-South Korea alliance.

O A litmus test for South Korea's strong commitment to regional security issues would be whether South Korea joins maritime patrols being conducted in Southeast Asia.

➔ If South Korea were asked to participate in a maritime patrol conducted by the US and the Philippines (alongside Australia and Japan), would it agree to join?

➔ Can Vietnam help South Korea enhance its visibility in maritime security?

➔ Satellite cooperation for MDA should be enhanced.

US-South Korea-Japan vs. North Korea-China-Russia

O US-South Korea-Japan

- Washington Declaration (April 2023): Establishment of the Nuclear Consultation Group
- Camp David Trilateral Summit (August 2023): Restoration of US-South Korea-Japan trilateral security cooperation.
- South Korea being a nuclear-latent state ?
 - Possible revision of the US-South Korea nuclear agreement, including discussions about recycling facilities within South Korea ?

O North Korea-China-Russia

- North Korea-Russia Summit in September 2023
- Emergence of a North Korea-China-Russia coalition?

Middle power-oriented minilateralism

O South Korea's Indo-Pacific strategy clearly outlines South Korea's strong commitment to middle power-oriented minilateralism.

- ➔ As South Korea-Japan and South Korea-Japan-the US security cooperation have been restored in 2023, South Korea, Japan and Australia need to seek ways to work together in ASEAN and in the Pacific as well as in Northeast Asia.
- ➔ Ex) South Korea should consider improving trilateral cooperation with Australia and Indonesia (KIA: Korea, India, Australia) as part of its Indo-Pacific strategy.
- ➔ The trilateral could be expanded to include the Philippines and Vietnam, which are highly interested in defense industry and energy cooperation with South Korea.

Session 1-4:

“Reputation or Reliability? Washington’s Options in a Taiwan Crisis”



Dr. Michael Hunzeker,
Professor, George Mason University

Preliminary findings from a multi-year study examining the reputational stakes suggest that Washington could face in a crisis over Taiwan. This analysis, which comes after three insightful presentations, is particularly timely given the geopolitical climate.

The study addresses the hypothetical but critical scenario of a conflict over Taiwan. While a war is not inevitable, the possibility cannot be dismissed, making it crucial for Washington to consider potential implications. A decision by the Chinese Communist Party to attack Taiwan would force the United States into a difficult position, having to choose between defending Taiwan, with the risk of escalating into a nuclear conflict, or abandoning a democratic ally, which could have significant repercussions.

Three main factors would influence Washington’s decision: the likelihood of military success, the strategic and economic importance of Taiwan, and the reputational consequences among core allies. This study focuses on the third factor, examining the views of experts from Australia, Japan, and South Korea over three years. While the methodology was not highly rigorous, the goal was to understand the perceived trade-offs and opportunity costs.

Reputation, in this context, refers to whether allies believe the U.S. will honor its commitments based on past actions. Reliability, on the other hand, is defined by the capabilities and shared interests in defending what matters most to these allies. The findings suggest that while reputation is important, reliability holds greater significance. Allies prefer the U.S. to uphold its commitments but do not expect it to risk everything to demonstrate resolve.

A surprising revelation from the study is the pragmatic stance of these allies. While they care about Taiwan, it is not considered a core national interest. An attack on Taiwan would highlight China’s ambitions and reinforce the need for a strong U.S. presence in the region. As long as the U.S. maintains its military presence in the Asia-Pacific, allies believe it will remain a crucial partner.

In conclusion, the top-level findings from Australia, Japan, and South Korea indicate that the U.S. should maintain its regional presence and avoid a major defeat. Allies expect the U.S. to defend Taiwan but prioritize swift, decisive actions without heavily relying on their military support.

Reputation or Reliability? Washington's Choices in a Taiwan Crisis

Michael A. Hunzeker, Associate Professor, Schar School of Policy & Government

Mark A. Christopher, Affiliate Professor, Schar School of Policy & Government

A CROSS-STRAIT WAR ISN'T INEVITABLE

- But if Beijing does attack Taipei...
- Washington will confront a painful choice
 - Roll the 'iron dice' to defend an erstwhile ally
 - Or abandon a vibrant democracy & a linchpin in the global economy
- What Washington decides to do will depend on how it views its:
 - Chances
 - Stakes
 - **Reputation**

IS REPUTATION WORTH DYING FOR?

- Our study
 - Assess the degree to which reputation should factor into Washington's calculus
 - By asking our closest allies in the region what they want & expect
- Our approach
 - Interview 100+ experts in & on Australia, Japan, & South Korea from '21 – '24
 - Ask each one how they might react to three basic scenarios:
 - Washington intervenes & 'saves' Taiwan
 - Washington intervenes, but loses
 - Washington stays on the sideline

THE PUNCHLINE

- US credibility doesn't depend on whether it defends Taiwan
 - It depends on whether it has enough military power in Asia to defend its other allies
 - Allies which are increasingly worried about defeat, escalation & Pyrrhic victory
- Because as much as allies care about reputation
 - Canberra, Seoul, & Tokyo do expect Washington to defend Taipei
 - And all three prefer it when Washington makes good on its commitments to others
- Reliability matters more
 - They know that the US can't defend them if it's exhausted – or worse
 - Even if the US abandons Taiwan, it will still be the only 'game in town'

REPUTATION VS. RELIABILITY

- Reputation
 - Do allies believe that we have a history of making good on our promises?
 - Based on perceptions of past behavior
- Reliability
 - Do allies think we can defend what matters most to them?
 - Based on assessments of current capabilities & interest alignment
- The two aren't necessarily zero sum
 - They can overlap if victory is guaranteed & allies share priorities
 - But they can be at odds when costs & risks go up & priorities diverge



Australia

- Australia loves the United States
 - Just not as much as Washington thinks
 - 100 years of 'mateship' only goes so far
- Canberra's view is fairly realpolitik
 - Taiwan's fate is not a core interest
 - A Chinese attack makes the US more important
 - Whether or not the US defends Taiwan
- As long as the US stays in the region
 - And doesn't suffer a major defeat
 - Then bandwagoning isn't in the cards

Japan

- US & Japanese priorities converge
 - A threat to Taiwan is a threat to Japan
- But if a quick victory is not assured
 - Then Japan will likely prefer non-intervention
 - And if the US defends Taiwan...
 - Direct support from the JSDF isn't guaranteed
- Tokyo will also stick with Washington
 - As long as US forces remain in Japan
 - And Washington can articulate a rationale
 - To help pro-US elites help sell a continued US presence in case of defeat or non-intervention



South Korea

- US-ROK priorities diverge
 - Seoul wants stability in the Taiwan Strait
 - But the DPRK is its top concern
- A US-led defense of Taiwan will put Seoul in a tough spot
 - The US could entangle South Korea
 - Beijing could coerce or punish Seoul
 - Pyongyang could take advantage
 - Or inadvertently abandon it
 - US forces could be drawn off the peninsula
 - A US defeat could trigger a US pullout
- More than other US allies
 - If the US sits a war over Taiwan out
 - Seoul might breathe a sigh of relief



Policy Recommendations

- The best option?
 - Avoiding having to choose between reputation & reliability
 - By footing the bill for deterrence
- Talk is cheap (& reputational talk could prove unhelpful)
 - Washington should spend less time on symbolic measures
 - While spending more money on real military power
 - Especially capabilities useful for both defending Taiwan & improving US posture in the region
- Deterrence is strongest when the US & its allies are on the same sheet of music
 - It's time for some frank & uncomfortable conversations among allies
 - The nuclear, simultaneity, & prolonged conflict risks are real

V. Session 2:

South Korea's Contributions as a Middle Power to Regional Security

15:30-16:45

Remarks

- **Ambassador Kathleen Stephens**, Former Ambassador of U.S. to Korea
- **Ambassador Ho-Young Ahn**, Former Ambassador of Korea to U.S.
- **Ambassador Jung-Seung Shin**, Former Ambassador of Korea to China

Panel Discussion

- Moderated by Prof. Ellen Laipson, George Mason University
-

This session, titled “South Korea’s Contributions as a Middle Power to Regional Security,” focused on a pragmatic and policy-centric viewpoint on the topic by inviting a panel composed of former ambassadors. The discussion included South Korea’s strategic position amidst the U.S.-China rivalry, its commitment to the Rules-Based International Order (RBIO), and the balancing of relations with both powers. Additionally, the impact of regional security dynamics, the deepening U.S.-Korea alliance, and the importance of engaging in multilateral efforts were elaborated. The session highlighted the need for consistent policy implementation, strengthening capabilities, and fostering diplomatic environments conducive to peace and prosperity.



South Korea's Development as a Global Pivotal Power

South Korea as a middle power can exert influence and play a significant role on the international stage. This notion of South Korea as a middle power has been a central part of its identity throughout its modern existence, and perhaps even earlier.

Historically, South Korea has often been a country acted upon rather than one taking proactive measures. The term “Hermit Kingdom,” referring to its isolationist past, and the idea of Korea being a “shrimp among whales,” implying it was often caught and crushed between greater powers, were frequently heard. However, South Korea now resembles a dolphin—an intelligent and agile middle power in the global arena.

South Korea's aspiration to play a greater international role can be traced back to key events such as the direct election of the president in 1988, which marked a decisive move towards democracy and economic growth. Hosting the Olympics that same year was pivotal, transforming Korea's international relationships and how it was perceived globally. In the following years, Korea built upon these achievements, further solidifying its status as a middle power. South Korea's growing economic, social, and cultural capacities have established it as an energetic and engaged middle power. In recent years, this has been amplified by its cultural products, notably music and films, which have provided an additional boost.

In recent years, the term “global pivotal state” has emerged, reflecting South Korea's deep-seated aspiration to be a proactive player on the world stage, shaping its destiny rather than being at the mercy of other powers. This ambition is deeply rooted in South Korea's history and its long-standing desire to have a significant global impact.



Geopolitical Challenges and Uncertainties

In recent years, instability and situational uncertainties have been rising in the Pacific region. U.S. is now emphasizing the supply chain and technology competition with China, and the democratic process versus authoritarianism.

The strategic rivalry between the U.S. and China has significantly impacted South Korea, pushing it much closer to the U.S. in the last two years. The heightened tension brought by North Korean nuclear provocations and lessons from the conflict in Ukraine have underscored the importance of the U.S.-Korea alliance and the necessity of the American extended nuclear deterrence for South Koreans. Consequently, South Korea has further aligned itself with American strategies in the Pacific. South Korea has become enthusiastic about trilateral coordination with Japan and the United States, as seen at the Camp David Summit last year.

On the other side, China blames the U.S. for forming a kind of Asian version of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and wants South Korea to balance its policies between the U.S. and China while expressing concerns on several strategic issues. The U.S. and South Korea have proposed nuclear dialogue with North Korea without conditions, however, North Korea is taking a different path, even threatening preemptive nuclear strikes and declaring South Korea as its main enemy. Meanwhile, China shows little interest in the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, emphasizing North Korean security concerns and the strength of North Korean-Russian military cooperation, which could further complicate denuclearization efforts.

While there is evident cooperation between China, Russia, and North Korea, China has its own national interests and reservations. Historical conflicts between China and Russia, coupled with China's wariness of increased military cooperation between Russia and North Korea, highlight the complexities of these relationships. China, now a major global power, seeks to play a dominant role in its relations with Russia and North Korea without being overly influenced by them.

China remains cautious about military moves by North Korea that could impact South Korea and strives to maintain its own national voice and interests. As a significant member of the international community, China is mindful of its relations with the U.S. and exercises caution in its strategic partnerships. Despite strategic cooperation with Russia and North Korea, China aims to balance its national interests with its global responsibilities.

While the U.S. seeks to engage South Korea in contingency planning, China demands South Korea not to interfere with Taiwan, considering it a core interest. South Korea has expressed its concern about the tensions and the potential for military collision, which could escalate into a broader conflict involving American forces in South Korea and North Korea.

China's leaders have certainly taken note of the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the formidable resistance mounted by a smaller nation, especially when backed by international allies. Any military move against Taiwan would likely undermine the political legitimacy of China's current leadership, including the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Moreover, the pursuit of the "China dream" necessitates continued economic development and effective management of domestic challenges, particularly those exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic.

Given the uncertainties and high risks associated with a military intervention, China is more likely to employ other tactics. These could include military exercises designed to intimidate Taiwan, propaganda

campaigns, and economic pressures aimed at coercing Taiwan into compliance with Chinese demands. In this context, South Korea's potential response to a Taiwan contingency becomes crucial. South Korea's security is closely intertwined with Taiwan's situation, owing to its alliance with the United States. Therefore, it's imperative for these allies to engage in discussions about contingency plans in the coming years, with South Korea clarifying its capabilities and limitations.



In 2017, the inaugural year of President Trump's administration, a series of significant trade measures were introduced. President Trump withdrew the U.S. from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and initiated amendments to trade agreements such as NAFTA and the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA). These actions prompted questions about the fate of the rule-based international order, especially from countries like Korea that had spent decades aligning with these rules. Trump's potential return could significantly disrupt U.S.-South Korea relations, underscoring the need for careful and strategic policy recommendations. Ultimately, the implications for the Korean Peninsula and the global community are substantial, particularly in the context of U.S.-China relations and the potential dangers in the next decade.



South Korea's journey from a "shrimp among whales" to a "global pivotal state" reflects its evolution and aspirations, however, it continues to face significant regional and global challenges. The country's proactive stance and determination to shape its own fate underscore its important role in the international community today. The need for shared responsibilities and the high expectations placed on South Korea and other allies in this dynamic geopolitical landscape are evident, reflecting both opportunities and challenges for the nation.

Envisioning Korea's Potential Role as a Global Pivotal Power

The geopolitical environment, both regionally and globally, presents stark choices and difficulties for South Korea. It finds itself in a position of having extraordinary capabilities—ranging from hard power to soft power and smart power—yet operating in a complex and demanding global landscape. This scenario brings to mind the opening of Charles Dickens' *A Tale of Two Cities*. For South Korea, it is the best of times and the worst of times. The country has reached a point where it has these extraordinary capabilities, and current geopolitical conditions provide both challenges and opportunities.

Central to Korea's strategic navigation in this complex landscape is its Indo-Pacific Strategy, announced in 2022. This Strategy is pivotal for Korea's positioning between the influence of the United States and China. While the rule-based international order is frequently cited as a framework for global governance, it is not uniformly supported by all countries. Nevertheless, Korea's unwavering support for this order is justified by its substantial benefits to Korea's development, industrialization, democratization, and international stature. The Indo-Pacific Strategy, under President Yoon's administration, underscores Korea's commitment to working with like-minded nations to further promote and defend this order. This strategic approach aligns with Korea's national interests and ensures its active participation in shaping regional dynamics.

There is no doubt that the U.S.-Korea alliance should be a cornerstone for peace and stability in South Korea and the region. More cooperation in science, technology, and mutual trade and investment should be promoted with global market insight. Therefore, the alliance with the U.S. is crucial for South Korea's security and economy.



South Korea's response to the war in Ukraine has been quite significant, reflecting its proactive stance in global affairs. This response not only underscores its relations with Ukraine but also highlights its importance as a market within Europe and the EU. The proactive diplomacy of South Korea is evident not just in summit meetings but also in its broader international engagements. For instance, President Yoon's visit to Washington for the NATO Summit continues a trend of

active participation in global forums, marking a new era of South Korea's diplomatic outreach. South Korea's consistent attendance at NATO Summits since President Yoon took office reflects its evolving security priorities and responsibilities on the world stage. This shift demonstrates South Korea's assessment of its security needs and its role in the international community.

Given this context, South Korea has an interesting role to play. Unlike the U.S., which cannot address every global issue simultaneously, South Korea has significant capabilities and a strategic need to set clear priorities. Increased attention and more effective engagement with allies and partners, especially in the Global South, is crucial. South Korea has been expanding its overseas development assistance, reflecting its growing role in global affairs.

In recent times, South Korea has been actively engaging with various regions, including Africa and Central Asia, showcasing its commitment to international cooperation. The presence of numerous African heads of state at a recent summit in South Korea highlights the country's diplomatic outreach. This engagement is reminiscent of past diplomatic efforts, such as those in the 1970s when South Korea actively lobbied at the United Nations. The focus on securing critical supply chains, particularly for minerals essential to the economy, is another strategic priority for South Korea. This issue has gained importance over the years, reflecting South Korea's need to guarantee the supply of critical resources. Meetings with American leaders and other international engagements further underscore the importance of these priorities.

In conclusion, South Korea's diplomatic and strategic efforts reflect a balance between global engagement and regional security needs. By outlining its Indo-Pacific Strategy and focusing on critical issues such as supply chains and diplomatic outreach, South Korea is positioning itself as a proactive and responsible global player. This approach is crucial for maintaining its economic and security interests amid the geopolitical challenges in the Indo-Pacific induced by great power rivalry.

VI. Conclusion



Prof. Ellen Laipson,

Director of Center for Security Policy Studies, George Mason University

Our symposium addressed the geopolitical landscape and South Korea's pivotal role within it, giving our participants a chance to reflect on both the immediate policy debates and concerns, and the broader implications of this moment. South Korea stands at a critical juncture, possessing substantial capabilities while facing an ever more complex global environment. South Korea's relationship with Washington has focused on ways to strengthen the alliance and find a more important role for Korea in the Indo-Pacific Strategy, which emphasizes cooperation with like-minded nations to promote a rules-based international order. At the same time, speakers acknowledged the potential changes in domestic politics in Washington and Seoul that could affect the stability and sustainability of the alliance.

The conversations highlighted potential sources of instability in the region, particularly uncertainties surrounding China's ambitions and actions, and the evolving U.S.-China relationship. As South Korea continues to develop its national security policies, agility in responding to any shifts in U.S. policy post-elections remains crucial. The very productive relationship between President Biden and President Yoon underscores the importance of maintaining strong ties and adapting to geopolitical shifts.

There were deep insights about where and how South Korea positions itself as a country of enormous success and prosperity, yet also lives with deep vulnerabilities based on the realities of the Korean peninsula and its immediate neighbors. The unsettled business of the conflict on the Peninsula and the new dynamics of how the partners and allies of the United States in the region manage the U.S.-China rivalry are critical issues.

We are meeting to celebrate the 10th anniversary of George Mason's campus in Korea, and our symposium reflects well the talent and dynamism of the campus, particularly the work of the Center for Security Policy Studies-Korea under the leadership of Professor Soyoung Kwon. The collaboration between George Mason University's main campus and the Mason Korea campus has proven highly productive, and today's event demonstrates how this partnership can enrich the discourse on security in the Asia-Pacific region. The quality of students from Mason Korea who study in the main campus in the U.S. has been impressive, significantly contributing to the Center for Security Policy Studies in Washington and deepening the understanding of Mason's students in the U.S. about Korea and its security challenges.

In conclusion, South Korea has become a global pivotal power. It has leveraged its diplomatic, military and economic capabilities effectively, and has proven to be a reliable and impressive partner to the U.S. and other international institutions, whether government, private sector or academic. Our dialogue today hopefully has made a contribution to the larger conversation about international security and South Korea's national security policies.

VII. Biographies of the Speakers



Dr. Soyoung Kwon

Director, Center for Security Policy Studies-Korea, George Mason University

Dr. Soyoung Kwon is currently an Associate Professor of Global Affairs and Director of Security Policy Studies-Korea of George Mason University Korea. Prior to joining George Mason University Korea, she taught as a lecturing professor at Graduate School of International Studies at Kyung Hee University, Chunbuk National University, and Yonsei University. She worked as a research associate fellow at the East Asia Institute of Cambridge University, and later as a Shorenstein fellow at the Asia Pacific Research Center of Stanford University. Dr. Kwon moved on to the government and policy sectors to serve at a spokesperson's office of the Ministry of Unification of the Republic of Korea and as a Korea specialist and advisor at the European Parliament in Brussels. She received B.A. in political science and diplomacy from Ewha Women's University and M.Phil and Ph.D. in political science from the University of Cambridge.



Dr. Chaesung Chun

Professor, Seoul National University

Chaesung Chun is a Professor and a Chair of the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Seoul National University. He is also a director of National Security Center of East Asian Institute (EAI). He is a member of the Advisory Committee of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defense, ROK Army and Navy. He is now the chair of the Advisory Committee of the Ministry of Unification. He was the President of the Korean Association of International Studies in 2021, a Director of Center for International Studies at Seoul National University, and a Vice President of the Institute of Peace and Unification Studies, Seoul National University. He was a visiting professor at Keio University in Tokyo from 2017-2018 and 2010-2011. Major books include *Northeast Asian International Relations Theory: Politics among Incomplete Sovereign States* (2020), *Sovereignty and International Relations: Modern Sovereign States System and the Evolution of the Empire* (2019), *Is Politics Moral: Reinhold Niebuhr's Transcendental Realism* (2012), *East Asian International Relations* (2011). He received B.A. and M.A. in International Relations from Seoul National University and Ph.D. in Political Science from Northwestern University.



Dr. Ketian Vivian Zhang

Professor, Schar School of Policy and Government, George Mason University

Dr. Ketian Vivian Zhang is an assistant professor of international security in the Schar School of Policy and Government at George Mason University. She studies rising powers, coercion, economic statecraft, and maritime disputes in international relations and social movements in comparative politics, with a regional focus on China and East Asia. Ketian bridges the study of international relations and comparative politics and has a broader theoretical interest in linking international security and international political economy. Her first book from Cambridge University Press examines when, why, and how China uses coercion when faced with issues of national security, such as territorial disputes in the South and East China Seas, foreign arms sales to Taiwan, and foreign leaders' reception of the Dalai Lama. Part of her research has appeared in *International Security*, *Journal of Strategic Studies*, and *Journal of Contemporary China*, among other venues. Ketian is currently working on her second book that explores the relationship between economic interdependence and rising power grand strategies. Ketian received her Ph.D. in Political Science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 2018, and is also a proud badger (on Wisconsin!).



Dr. Jae Jeok Park

Professor, Graduate School of International Studies and Underwood International College, Yonsei University

Jae Jeok Park is currently Associate Professor at the Graduate School of International Studies and Underwood International College, Yonsei University. Previously, he worked as a visiting professor at Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security (IFANS) (Jan. 2010 - August 2010) and a research fellow at Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU) (Sep. 2010 - August 2014). Also, he was Assistant and Associate Professor at the Graduate School of International and Area Studies, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies in Seoul (HUFS) (Sep. 2014 – Feb. 2023). His research interests include alliance politics, U.S. security policy in the Indo-Pacific, the U.S.-ROK alliance, and the U.S.-Australia alliance. He received his B.A and M.I.S. from Yonsei University, M.A. and M.S. from Northwestern University in the U.S., and Ph.D. from Australian National University (December 2009).



Dr. Michael A. Hunzeker

Professor, Schar School of Policy and Government, George Mason University

Michael A. Hunzeker is an associate professor at Schar School of Policy and Government, the associate director of the Schar School's Center for Security Policy Studies, and a Senior Non-Resident Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. He studies in defense reform and Cross-Strait deterrence, and his work has appeared in Security Studies, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, Nikkei Asia, War on the Rocks, the RUSI Journal, the Journal of Strategic Studies, PS: Politics and Political Science, Parameters, and Defense One. Michael's book on wartime learning, *Dying to Learn: Wartime Lessons from the Western Front* was published with Cornell University Press in 2021. He has also co-authored monographs on conventional deterrence in northeastern Europe and the Taiwan Strait. Michael served in the U.S. Marine Corps from 2000–2006 and holds an A.B. from the University of California, Berkeley as well as a Ph.D., M.P.A., and A.M. from Princeton University.



Ambassador Kathleen Stephens

Former Ambassador of the United States to Republic of Korea

Ambassador Kathleen Stephens is a former American diplomat. She was U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Korea 2008-2011, and also served earlier in Korea as a Peace Corps volunteer in the 1970s and a political officer at the U.S. Embassy in Seoul in the 1980s. Other overseas assignments during a three-decade Foreign Service career included China, India, Northern Ireland, former Yugoslavia, Portugal and Trinidad and Tobago. In Washington she was Director for European Affairs at the National Security Council during the Clinton Administration, and later Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, and Acting Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy. Ambassador Stephens chairs the Board of Directors of The Korea Society, and is Vice-Chair of The Asia Foundation Board of Trustees. She was President of the Korea Economic Institute of America, 2018-2023. She now divides her time between Washington, DC and western Montana, and continues to write and speak on U.S.-Korean relations and U.S. foreign policy.



**Ambassador
Ho-Young Ahn**

Former Ambassador of Republic of
Korea to the United States

Ambassador Ho-Young Ahn is Chair Professor of North Korean Studies at Kyung-Nam University. Before this, he worked as the President of the University of North Korean Studies (2018-22). Ambassador Ahn used to be the Republic of Korea's Ambassador to the United States (2013-17). He also used to work as Deputy Minister for Trade, Ambassador to the European Union and Belgium, and the First Vice Foreign Minister. Ambassador Ahn studied International Relations and Law at Seoul National University (B.A.), Georgetown University (M.S.), Korea National Open University (LLB) and Georgetown Law School (LLM). He received a Ph.D. degree (Hon.) in Political Science from Kyung-Nam University.



**Ambassador
Jung-Seung Shin**

Former Ambassador of Republic of
Korea to China

Ambassador Jung-Seung Shin, a former Korean Ambassador to China, is now the Director of the East Asia Institute, Dongseo University in Busan. He joined the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1975 and his foreign service includes First Secretary at the Korean Embassy in the U.S. Counselor to Japan, Minister to China, Ambassador to New Zealand. Most of his job in Seoul centered on the Asia-Pacific affairs in the South Korean Foreign Ministry, from the director for Chinese Affairs, to the Director-General of the Asia Pacific Bureau. Besides, he worked as the Spokesperson of the Foreign Ministry, and a Senior Foreign Relations Adviser to the Governor of Gyeonggi Province. He retired from the Government in 2010 and opened the Center for Chinese Studies in the Korean National Diplomatic Academy and worked as the managing director until 2015.



Prof. Ellen Laipson

Director, Center for Security Policy
Studies, George Mason University

Ellen Laipson is the director of the Master's in International Security degree program and the Center for Security Policy Studies in the Schar School of Policy and Government at George Mason University. She joined Mason after a distinguished 25-year career in government and as president and CEO of the Stimson Center (2002-15). Laipson serves on a number of academic and other nongovernmental boards related to international security and diplomacy, and is a columnist for worldpoliticsreview.com. Her last post in government was vice chair of the National Intelligence Council (1997-2002). Laipson also served on the State Department's policy planning staff, the National Security Council staff, and the Congressional Research Service. A member of the Council on Foreign Relations, she serves on the Advisory Councils of the Chicago Council on Global Affairs and Georgetown University's Institute for the Study of Diplomacy. Laipson served on the board of the Asia Foundation (2003-15) and the Council of the International Institute of Strategic Studies (2009-19). She was a member of the CIA External Advisory Panel from 2006-09, President Obama's Intelligence Advisory Board from 2009-13, and on the Secretary of State's Foreign Affairs Policy Board 2011-14. She received a M.A. from the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies and an A.B. from Cornell University.

VIII. The Organizing Team



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2024 CSPA-Korea International Security Symposium

The Role of Korea in the Evolving Indo-Pacific Security Dynamics

인도-태평양 안보환경 변화와 한국의 역할

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