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Prospects for Peace on the Korean Peninsula in Northeast Asia’s Changing Security Landscape

MAY 24, 2022 | 10:00-16:00 (KST)
Small Theater, Incheon Global Campus

Session I:
Peace and Security on the Korean Peninsula: The U.S. Perspective
Moderator:
Dr. Ji Hye Lim, Acting Director, Center for Security Policy Studies-Korea
Speakers:
Mr. Chris Del Corso, U.S. Charge d’Affaires ad interim
Dr. Daniel Pinkston, Lecturer in International Relations, Troy University
Dr. Mike Bosack, Founder, Parley Policy Initiative & Special Advisor for Government Relations, Yokosuka Council on Asia-Pacific Studies

Session II:
Peace and Korean Unification: Korea’s Perspective
Moderator:
Mr. George Hutchinson, Visiting Fellow, Center for Security Policy Studies-Korea
Speakers:
Dr. Sang Hyun Lee, President of Sejong Institute
Dr. Min Hong, Director of North Korean Research Division, Korea Institute for National Unification
Dr. Young Jun Kim, Director of Center for the Northeast Asian Affairs, Research Institute for National Security Affairs (RINSA), Korea National Defense University

Session III:
Prospect and Challenge for Peace and Security in Northeast Asia: U.S.-Korea Dialogue
Moderator:
Prof. Ellen Laipson, Director of Center for Security Policy Studies
Speakers:
Mr. Robert Collins, Senior Advisor, Committee for Human Rights in North Korea
Gen. In-Bum Chun, Lieutenant General (Ret)
Dr. Intaeck Han, President of Jeju Peace Institute

Organizer: Center for Security Policy Studies
Host: George Mason University
Sponsor: UNIKOREA FOUNDATION
2022 CSPS-Korea Symposium titled <Prospects for Peace on the Korean Peninsula in Northeast Asia’s Changing Security Landscape> will host an open platform for discussions on the theme of changing dynamics of the security landscape in the Northeast Asia region and its impacts on peace and security of the Korean Peninsula. By addressing timely issues pertaining to peace, security, and Korean unification from the U.S. and Korea perspectives, the Symposium will also provide meaningful insight on prospects and challenges set for the security landscape in Northeast Asia through the U.S.-Korea dialogue.

Theme 1. Peace and Security on the Korean Peninsula: The U.S. Perspective
The United States and South Korea are long-time allies and security partners. Yet respective viewpoints on the peace and security agenda and the priority order have not been on the same page at times. Sharing perspectives and understanding the concerns are important steps towards closer coordination, finding consistency, and building credibility in the coming years. This first session invites the U.S. experts to outline the U.S. perspective on prospects for peace on the Korean Peninsula with the dynamic of the changing security landscape in Northeast Asia. The main questions to address in this session include what the U.S. policy priority and ultimate goal in the Indo-Pacific region may be, how the U.S. sees its role in the Korean Peninsula and beyond, and what potential challenges in pursuing the policy will be. By answering the questions, the panel will discuss prospects for cooperative security policy between Biden and Yoon administrations.

Theme 2. Peace and Korean Unification: Korea’s Perspective
The new Yoon Suk-yeol administration puts South Korea on a very different foreign policy trajectory from the previous Moon presidency. The Yoon administration is aligning South Korea’s defense and foreign policy more closely with Washington. This not only includes bolstering South Korea’s defense capabilities and strengthening the ROK-U.S. military alliance, but also extends to support for the Indo-Pacific strategy of cooperating with like-minded democracies in the region, including Japan. The expected results are more frequent and larger combined ROK-U.S. military exercises, the redeployment of strategic U.S. assets to South Korea, expansion of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, greater U.S.-South Korea-Japan trilateral cooperation, and South Korean support for the informal grouping of democratic “Quad” nations. In the meantime, there are increasing calls from within South Korea for the
country to seriously consider developing its own indigenous nuclear weapons program as an enhanced deterrence against North Korea. China and North Korea are likely to vehemently disapprove of the Yoon administration’s foreign policy direction. Thus, all these developments carry the strong potential to strain South Korea’s relations with China and North Korea, creating complications and challenges for security in the region. This panel examines these issues and their impacts through the lens of regional security and prospects for a peace settlement on the Korean Peninsula.

Theme 3. Prospect and Challenge for Peace and Security in Northeast Asia: The U.S.-Korea Dialogue

This culminating session will bring the discussions in the earlier sessions to another level to synthesize and coordinate thoughts among American and Korean experts. The recent Biden-Yoon meeting offered a blueprint of a common agenda for the United States and South Korea. Following up on the outcomes of the meeting, this session will attempt to identify ways both the U.S. and ROK can improve communication and cooperation for the brighter peace and security prospects in the Northeast Asian region. The session will explore changes in ROK-U.S. relations since the beginning of the Biden Administration, and with the election of the Yoon Administration to examine the areas of continuity and consensus. It will closely look at the potential areas of disagreement: 1) setting priorities in security matters, particularly the challenge from the DPRK; 2) improving Asia-Pacific security cooperation and alliances; 3) dealing with the rise of China and Chinese pressures on the ROK; and 4) planning for alternative futures on the Korean peninsula - thinking about unification.
Opening Remarks

Welcome Remarks
Dr. Robert Matz
Dr. Mark Rozell

Constatulatory Address
Mr. Chris Del Corso
It is my pleasure and honor to welcome you to our annual symposium Center for Security Policy Studies-Korea (CSPS-K). This symposium is organized by George Mason’s Schar School of Policy and Government, hosted by Mason Korea and its Center for Security Policy Studies-Korea, and sponsored by the UniKorea Foundation. It is particularly joyous to host the first in-person annual symposium since May 2019. Welcome all.

The CSPS-K is a branch of the Center for Security Policy Studies (CSPS) on George Mason’s Fairfax campus. The CSPS is a multidisciplinary research center whose members include experts in economics, history, political science, and sociology, as well as distinguished practitioners-in-residence. The CSPS-K is similarly multidisciplinary.

With a focus on international security, the CSPS leverages its Arlington, VA location, just across the Potomac River from Washington, DC, to draw on the city’s large numbers of defense and security experts, government officials, and senior military officers. The CSPS-K is similarly situated near Seoul, and the similar access this capital city offers to officials and experts in the defense, security and policy realms.

Most of all, the connection between the two centers recognizes the value—indeed, the necessity—of dialogue on international security that crosses national boundaries. The connection also contributes to the central mission of George Mason Korea to provide a platform for such transnational dialogue across a range of topics.

The topic of this year’s symposium is timely. There is a new presidential administration in South Korea, and the U.S. President Biden has just completed a visit to South Korea and Japan. This symposium attempts to discuss the common security agenda for the U.S. and South Korea and ways to improve communication and cooperation for peace not only on the Korean peninsula but also in the northeast Asia region.

We are fortunate to have here today a set of distinguished, multidisciplinary and international scholars to discuss the prospects for peace and security on the Korean peninsula from both the U.S. and Korean perspectives. I am pleased to welcome them to the Incheon Global Campus and to Mason Korea, and I hope that the conversations today will be just the beginning of a set of fruitful collaborations around this issue.
Welcome Remarks

Dr. Mark Rozell
Dean, Schar School of Policy and Government, George Mason University

I want to welcome each of you to the Symposium organized by the Center for Security Policy Studies in Korea, a branch of the Center by the same name based at the Schar School in Arlington, Virginia.

This year’s topic, <Prospects for Peace on the Korean Peninsula in Northeast Asia’s Changing Security Landscape>, could not be more timely. From the enduring tensions with North Korea and its expanding missile and nuclear capabilities, to changes in the leadership here in Korea, to the just completed summit between the American and Korean presidents, you have a fascinating and dynamic agenda to cover today. The participants include our first graduate level class from the Schar School visiting Korea as part of a new course on security in Northeast Asia. I hope our students will find today’s discussions an enriching part of the course and will find opportunities to meet and engage with the experts from Korea’s government and non-government institutions present today. I was pleased to see on the program some of the leading public policy and national security intellectuals in Korea, who have studied and lived firsthand with the many security challenges and the many positive changes that have occurred in Korea in recent years.

Today’s program involved the work of many people, and I want to express my deep appreciation to Professor Soyoung Kwon, the founding director of the CSPS-K branch. She is currently in the U.S., but worked with the Center’s Acting Director, Professor Ji Hye Lim, and the student fellows to develop this excellent program. George Hutchinson, a former U.S. Air Force officer and current PhD candidate at the Schar School, also played a critical role in preparing today’s program. I know that Professor Ellen Laipson, who directs the International Security Master’s program at Schar, and the Center for Security Policy Studies, joins me in thanking this terrific team, and the leadership at Mason Korea, Dean Robert Matz and Associate Dean Shannon Davis, who have supported these activities and are always eager to strengthen the ties between the university in Virginia, and its campus here in Korea.

I also convey a special thanks to the UniKorea Foundation for supporting this special event. I want to wish you all a productive, stimulating and enjoyable day as you explore the many high stakes issues at play in Korea, and the larger Northeast Asian region.
It is great to be here and thank you Dean Davis for your welcome remarks on behalf of Dean Matz. And thank you for hosting this great event. Thank you to Chair Ryu for being here for his presence and thank you to UniKorea foundation and Secretary Jeon as well as Dean of George Mason University Schar School Dr. Rozell as well as Dr. Laipson for helping to speak today. And most importantly, I want to thank all of you graduate students who are here participating who traveled to Korea to participate in the symposium and the Study Abroad Program. Without any doubt, the U.S.-ROK relations is facing a very significant moment today with shaping and aligning the countries’ respective foreign policies being the ultimate goal to be addressed and achieved. Also, we are looking forward to strengthening the U.S.-Korea alliance and resolve the complex challenges that we face in this region, which makes today’s discussion critically important to our future.

I’m also particularly honored to be here today because I have a family connection to George Mason University. My father-in-law was an economics professor at George Mason for 30 years, from 1972 to 2002 and retired as a professor emeritus from the University. So, it’s my great honor to be here with you today. As you all know and as it is mentioned before, President Biden has just completed his first trip to Korea just a few days ago. And I cannot overstate the significance of his visit, as it demonstrated, the importance of the U.S.-Korea alliance to both the Korean and American people. President Biden and President Yoon had a warm and productive engagement has set the conditions for their U.S.-ROK relations to grow even stronger. This month we are celebrating the 140th anniversary of diplomatic relations between the United States and Korea. The foundation we laid back in 1882 on May 22nd, has grown from small commercial and religious ties to a robust alliance during the Korean War and finally has grown into a global partnership as the Republic of Korea has evolved into a diplomatic, economic, military, and cultural powerhouse.

President Biden and President Yoon shared the same vision of a peaceful and prosperous Northeast Asia where disputes can be resolved through diplomacy and mutual respect and enable the countries in the region to benefit from trade based upon stable, international rule-based order. I hope you have a chance to read some of the summit joint press statements that both presidents put out. Both Presidents’ goals are clearly laid out in the statement and chart of a clear course on how we will expand our growing global partnership. President Biden and President Yoon concur that the alliance has matured into a deep and comprehensive strategic partnership. Through the people-to-people ties, extensive commercial investments and links, commitment to democracy, human rights, and rule-based order, the ROK and the U.S. are fomenting a relationship that is capable of meeting any challenge and seizing all opportunities that emerge. Security is featured prominently in the joint statement. America’s commitment to the defensive Korea is ironclad and our dedication to the establishment of the sustainable, permanent peace on the Korean peninsula is unwavering. And that’s the way it has been for almost 70 years, and it will not change. Yet today, we face unprecedented threats posed by authoritarian
States like China, Russia, and North Korea. And we are redefining and reinforcing the future of our shared security with joint initiatives that are modern, forward-looking, and global. The bonds we first forged generations ago will continue to make Koreans and Americans safer, incorporating in every aspect of global security including not only conventional defense, but also economic security, cyber security, civil exploration and peaceful uses of space, crisis management and emergency response, health security, climate change mitigation and much more. Putting security first afforded this ability necessary for the Republic of Korea to become one of the world largest economies. The United States will remain Korea’s armor of choice for increased trade, investment, and joint innovation to ensure continued economic security and prosperity for all. America is one of the Korea’s largest trading and investment partners, and the businesses and industries of both countries see the mutual benefits in bilateral economic cooperation. Why? Because it is rooted in our shared values and commitment to rule of law, market principles, ensuring we have intellectual property rights and human rights in everything that we do. Overall, I am very optimistic for the future of the U.S.-ROK relations. While the presidents have given us a lot of work at the embassy and the Korean government to work on for both our countries, we are very much committed to working on all of these issues and moving forward these goals to help our countries, the Indo Pacific region, and the world become more peaceful and prosperous.

Thank you again to George Mason University and UniKorea Foundation for hosting this wonderful event and I will look forward to speaking more with you and answering your question during the panel.
Theme 1. Peace and Security on the Korean Peninsula: The U.S. Perspective

Moderator
Dr. Ji Hye Lim

Speakers
Mr. Chris Del Corso
Dr. Daniel Pinkston
Dr. Mike Bosack
I will give my perspective on President Biden’s recent trip and highlight the key takeaways on the peace and security issues that came out of the summit. As was recently talked about, we are two weeks into President Yoon’s administration. This is especially meaningful for us to have President Biden come here traveling so soon into President Yoon’s administration. You know being the first stop on his Asia tour, and for some of us who pay attention, I look at this as his first bilateral visit during his administration. He did go to Poland and talked about Ukrainian issues, but this is really his first bilateral stop. It also demonstrates the priority that President Biden puts on alliances. He is also very much looking to prove and show the importance of the U.S.-ROK alliance. And the United States’ strong commitment to the ironclad and watertight alliance that we have with the Republic of Korea.

During the summit last Saturday, President Biden built upon the goals that he previously established last year during the summit in May in Washington D.C., acknowledging our nearly 70-year history of alliance that was forged in the fires of the Korean War. President Biden and President Yoon reaffirmed their mutual commitment to the defense of the Republic of Korea and strengthening the combined defense posture under the ROK-U.S. mutual defense treaty. President Biden also emphasized the United States’ commitment to providing extended deterrence using the full range of capabilities including nuclear, conventional, and missile capabilities. Given North Korea’s refusal to entertain any offer to resume diplomatic talks, while at the same time increasing the number of its provocations, both presidents agreed to start discussions on expanding the scope and the scale of our combined military exercises that had been reduced to create a space for diplomacy. They also reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to deploy strategic military assets in a timely and coordinated manner.

This would include such capabilities as carrier strike groups, fifth-generation aircraft, and strategic bombers. Both leaders committed to further strengthening deterrence by reinforcing the combined defense posture and reaffirmed their commitment to the conditions-based transition of wartime operational control. Both presidents also agreed to postpone all activities that undermined, destabilize, and threaten rules-based international order and pledged to maintain peace and stability, lawful unimpeded commerce, and respect for international law including freedom of navigation and overflight in the South China Sea and beyond. President Biden and President Yoon also emphasized the importance of preserving peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. The presidents discussed the ongoing tragedy in Ukraine due to Russia’s continued and expanded aggression and vowed to stand together with the international community in condemning Russia’s unprovoked and further aggression against Ukraine. Both countries, along with international partners, have responded to the clear violations of international law and imposed our own financial restrictions and sanctions and export controls against
WHAT I JUST PRESENTED CLEARLY FALLS UNDER SECURITY. BOTH PRESIDENTS SPENT MUCH TIME DURING THE SUMMIT DISCUSSING HOW TO NURTURE AND LEVERAGE PEACE. AND IN MY MIND, PEACE GOES SIMPLY BEYOND THE NONSTATE OF WAR. IT REALLY IS WHAT WE CAN DO TOGETHER DURING A PERIOD OF STABILITY THAT OUR COMBINED DETERRENT CREATES TO PROMOTE PROSPERITY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE ROLE OF LAW.


THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND THE UNITED STATES ARE FOCUSED ON JOINT RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVES TIED TO CRITICAL EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES BECAUSE BOTH OUR COUNTRIES HAVE A PROVEN HISTORY OF EXCELLENCE IN INNOVATION. THE WORLD NEEDS KOREA AND THE UNITED STATES TO WORK TOGETHER TO PUSH PROGRESS ON SUCH THINGS AS THE DIGITAL ECONOMY, BIOTECHNOLOGY, AND RESPONSIBLE USE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, AND BOTH COUNTRIES ARE NATURAL PARTNERS IN AREAS LIKE CLEAN ENERGY TECHNOLOGY, HIGHER EDUCATION, AND SUSTAINABLE AGRICULTURE. BOTH KOREANS AND AMERICANS CARE DEEPLY ABOUT THE FUTURE OF THE PLANET AND WHAT THE CLIMATE CRISIS MEANS FOR FUTURE GENERATIONS. THE UNITED STATES IS COMMITTED TO LEADING IN COMBATING CLIMATE CHANGE, AS DID KOREA BY VOWING TO CUT GREENHOUSE EMISSIONS DRASTICALLY IN LESS THAN A DECADE. TO MEET SUCH AGGRESSIVE TARGETS, WE WILL NEED TO WORK TOGETHER WITH UNPRECEDENTED DETERMINATION AND ENCOURAGE OTHERS TO DO THE SAME. TO ENCOURAGE LONG-TERM SECURITY AND TO MEET THE SHARED ECONOMIC GOALS I HAVE OUTLINED, THE ROK-US WILL NEED TO DRAW ON A UNIQUE TALENT OF PEOPLE FROM EVERY FACET OF OUR SOCIETY. WE CANNOT LEAVE ANYONE ON THE SIDELINES BECAUSE OF GENDER, RACE, NATIONAL ORIGIN, DISABILITY STATUS, OR SEXUAL ORIENTATION. THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA HAS EMERGED AS A GLOBAL
leader, and that plays a critical role in fostering emerging democracies as well as
upholding democratic principles around the world. Both nations strive to guarantee
freedoms for those outside their borders. The ROK and the United States must continue
to ensure safeguards and uphold democratic principles within our borders as well. As both
are historical allies and likeminded partners, the Republic of Korea and the United States
are uniquely positioned to work together to promote democratic values in ways that
undermine the influence of authoritative regimes in the region and globally, In America,
we often say that democracy is a work in progress, but we must continue to strive hand-
in-hand and be a credible voice for promoting human rights and the fundamental
freedoms abroad by modeling diversity, equity, and tolerance at home.

The ROK is an essential and equal and capable partner with the U.S., but fortunately, the
United States and the ROK do not stand alone. There are other nations who think like us.
Regional security, stability, and prosperity are even stronger when the United States, the
Republic of Korea, and Japan work together to promote deterrence, market principles,
and democratic values as we move forward to address the most difficult 21st century
challenges not just here in Northeast Asia or the Indo-Pacific, but around the world. It is
in the fundamental interests of all three nations to support closer cooperation with each
other. I have covered a lot of grounds here. And there are still many topics that were
discussed at the summit that, due to time constraints, I have not mentioned. But the
bottom line though is that the Biden-Yoon summit was an overwhelming success and
reaffirmed the strong and enduring alliance that has endured and adapted to change for
nearly 70 years. For 140 years, Korea and U.S. diplomatic and economic relations have
only deepened, and there is no doubt in my mind that the alliance and our partnerships
will continue for another 70 years and another 140 years, and beyond.
I am an American citizen and a student of International Relations. Of course, I cannot ignore that U.S. position, the international system, but it is not my specialty. But I was asked to talk about the U.S. perspective or U.S. view. In the past term that just finished, one of the classes I taught was national security policy, and U.S. national security policy and I learned a lot of things from that. I can draw on that to give you kind of an idea of what challenges and problems, the high-level policymakers deal with. So, I gave my students the assignment. Normally, graduate students would be given a research paper, a policy paper that requires a lot of writing as the assignment. The idea was that they were a committee or special committee such as an Ad Hoc committee on a specific policy, and they were presenting this to the Deputies Committee in the National Security Council, U.S. National Security Council, to bump it up to the Principals Committee and to get it to the President. And I gave them the luxury of picking whatever topic they wanted. I said something they should be interested in, but they would have to argue their case on why it is important, why it demands or needs a policy response and why it needs to get kicked up to the principals meeting, the Cabinet, and the President. So, they picked a wide variety of topics from narcotics trafficking, the North Korean Nuclear Program, climate change in Central America, the threat of nuclear war in Europe and native Russian threats, cyber security, and a broad range of issues. And I think that reflects the reality that the president and the senior policymakers face in the U.S., in a complex world that is rapidly changing.

So, the way they have to deal, and make choices, there is a short bandwidth and limited time to deal with these issues. So quite often we will be out here on the Korean peninsula. We have a very narrow focus on specific topics or problems. But when you reach the pinnacle of policy being processed, the president in the white house deals with global interests. It’s very complex. I wanted to discuss the changing global environment and the changing regional environment here in Northeast Asia, U.S. threat perception the priorities for Northeast Asia, which Chargé d’Affaires mentioned, U.S. views on cooperation, some recommendations, and a conclusion.

So, as we have seen, particularly in the last few years, there has been a lot of disruption and unanticipated challenges brought in part by these issues we see up here that we have been familiar dealing within our daily lives. The pandemic, economic disruption, accelerated climate change, food insecurity, which is being exacerbated by the invasion of Ukraine, human migration, etc. Rise of China and Russian aggression. Dealing with all of these simultaneously creates a number of problems. Also, raise these unanswered questions; Has deglobalization begun? Has economic globalization in FDI and the trade of goods and services peaked? So, this is on the agenda which is mentioned also in Tokyo.

This Indo-Pacific economic form for prosperity. Is that what it is? It is whatever the new acronym is. Looking at supply chain resiliency, dealing with corruption, reshoring or friend shoring some of the investment components, supply chains, etc.
Are we witnessing, will we witness a kind of retrenchment or bifurcation of economic cooperation spheres? There has been a lot of talk of, a kind of a new cold war. China and Russia moving into a cooperative relationship against the West. As these global structures shift, what are the implications for the institutions and the regimes that were created to enable or enhance international cooperation?

Will we see new institutions? Will we see them modified or transformed in some way? This is something that we will have to watch moving forward. So, at the global level, this is not exhaustive. The U.S., from the U.S. perspective, I look at it, you know policy making look at an issue area. So, the problem emerges. It's food insecurity, human migration, or a pandemic. Then what do we do? How do we deal with it? Then they are appropriate institutions for addressing those types of problems. They are also regional institutions. And we have the institution in East Asia. The IFEP is not up there, we have a whole list. This is not exhaustive, of course.

You face a number of traditional threats and security threats, and potential challenges from the PRC, DPRK, Russia, space securities, these types of things. Non-traditional security threats and challenges. So, in the shadow of these challenges or threats, there are also opportunities for cooperation. So many of these problems are transboundary problems. No single actor can resolve them alone. That is why alliances and partnerships are the strength. I think a lot of enemies or adversaries in the U.S. misunderstand this. Chargé d’Affaires mentioned the diversity of the United States. Many people look at this as a potential weakness and try to drive wedges between different groups based on race or ethnicity or background, or sexual orientation. I concur that this is the strength of the United States and the alliances and partners that we have. A lot of states are insecure. They wish to stand alone and have complete autonomy. The types of relationships we have with allies like South Korea, Japan, NATO, and others. This is a great strength that U.S. adversaries and adversities of the ROK, for example, cannot replicate. And they try to drive wedges or to kind of undermine those relationships. So, there are opportunities for us when we face these threats. In traditional security, these challenges, you know, extended deterrence, deterring North Korean aggression, preventing conflict, maintaining the armistice regime, OpCon was mentioned. Basically, the Republic of Korea has operational control of ROK military forces. They are only transferred if the two command authorities agree to transfer them in wartime, but that has been politicized, and a lot of discussion about that. Missile threats, maritime security, space, security, and cybersecurity; were mentioned in the summits. They were mentioned when secretary Lincoln and Secretary Austin came out last year. This is an area of cooperation. I expect to see greater, trilateral and minilateral different groups that can cooperate in these areas, Australia, Canada, and so forth. Of course, WMD, proliferation, export controls, counter-proliferation.

In non-traditional security, we have these problems here. Food security could be a sudden crisis or a problem that could emerge in North Korea exacerbated by the THAAD, famine, and so forth. Some of these problems are compounded or complex with multiple variables driving them and can create these sudden unanticipated consequences. So, the relationships in the alliances are fundamental in addressing those. That is why I think the summit was important. A lot of people were looking for some surprise announcements.
So, one of the things I said was building the personal relationships and trust between the leaders, having that face-to-face meeting, because the very critical issues that kicked up, get kicked up to the presidential level, and where the two states would have to cooperate OPCON transfer, deployment of certain weapon systems, responding to a serious crisis, or the use of WMD or chemical weapons. Then it would be at that level where they would have to make a joint decision.

So generally, the U.S. approach to cooperation whether it is multilateral, or you can use minilateral small number of states four to six or eight, or bilateral. It depends upon the issue area. For issues addressed in multilateral forms, the U.S. and ROK can cooperate to achieve common goals such as climate change, global food insecurity, natural disasters, human displacement, migration, economic security, including supply chain vulnerabilities, which has been an important point for the Biden administration, was the first in the summit. Minilateral, small groups can cooperate, incorporating the U.S., the ROK, and other like-minded partners. We had the four-party talks back in the 90s, dealing with North Korea, six-party talks. Usually, these are on an ad hoc basis as a problem arises. Trilateral cooperation U.S., Japan, and the Republic of Korea. I have been a student of East Asia for a long time. I understand the historical animosity or historical legacy and some heartburn about that. But when we look at the national interest of these three partners, they align quite closely looking at the threat environment. So, I am hopeful that there will be greater trilateral cooperation, but that does not mean forgetting about the historical legacy and historical past. Cyber security, space security, missile defense, and WMD proliferation are no-brainers where the three partners can cooperate. So, let us see U.S.-ROK common interests and areas for cooperation. Again, this is just bilateral. It is a lot of overlap between the issues.

One of the things that I think is important is strategic communications. Public diplomacy, public affairs, MISO or PSYOPS, that is military use of information warfare, information operations. I think some of the successes of the alliance, the relationships, those partnerships that the U.S. has with other nations, NGOs, civil society, and so forth. The messaging does not always get out. Some of our adversaries, the authoritarian regimes are very active in the social media space. This is difficult to do because of course it is not controlled by the government. So, in a democracy, there are non-state actors, different groups, and civil society that are active here. But I think getting out that message of kind of success, the democracies, partnerships, something the Biden administration focuses on to show that this is successful and is the path to prosperity rather than the model of the authoritarian regime like Russia or PRC or North Korea. One of the issues I have is beware of this U.S. domestic politics wildcard. I do not follow domestic politics that closely, but there is an attraction to authoritarianism in the U.S. as well. You know, this rise of racism and politics of fear neo-isolationism. I think this is why the administration has been less forward-leaning on this IFVP, for example. You know, non-binding agreements are kind of standards of things like that, but that is because of domestic politics in the United States.

So, we need to assess the common threat perceptions and risks, assess the adequacy of plans and instruments for addressing threats, increase cooperation where planning and preparation are inadequate, and take advantage of the opportunities to address
weaknesses whether they are real or perceived, increase economic security cooperation including the supply chain issues. So, this has been the weak link on the U.S. side again, because of U.S. domestic politics, there is kind of an anti-globalization faction or element in the United States. But without that economic component U.S. strategy, I think, in East Asia and the world is kind of dead in the water. So, this is something we are going to have to address. Maintain military readiness. I was pleased with the announcements about the ability to deploy strategic assets. I am not a warmonger. I am a peaceful guy, but sometimes the path to peace and security requires balancing resolve in addressing threats in a material way to deter aggression. Maintain the UNC and the new armistice regime. Improve strategic communications. And then exploit North Korean weaknesses. North Korea has a lot of advantages. A lot of people panic, and North Korea has nukes, and we are doomed and everything. But they have a number of weaknesses and disadvantages. I would not trade a place in North Korea for a minute. I have been there like six times. And it is worse than what you see in the pictures and the videos.
Changing Global Environment

- Regional: EU, NATO, African Union (AU), OAS, Mercosur, SCO
- East Asia: APEC, ASEAN, ADB, AIIB, SF Treaty & alliance system (US-ROK and US-Japan security treaties), QUAD, Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP)

Changing Regional Environment

- Traditional security threats and potential challenges
  - PRC, DPRK, Russia, space security
- Non-traditional security threats and challenges
  - Human security, human rights, food insecurity, natural disasters, human displacement/migration, piracy, cybersecurity, terrorism, narcotics trafficking, international organized crime, information warfare and/or influence operations, public health
- Opportunities for cooperation exist in the shadow of threats and challenges

U.S. Threat Perceptions and Priorities for NE Asia

- Issues/challenges in traditional security:
  - Deterring NK aggression and preventing conflict (the armistice regime, OPCON)
  - Extended deterrence and nuclear umbrella
  - Missile threats and missile defense
  - Maritime security
  - Space security
  - Cybersecurity
  - WMD proliferation, export controls, and counter-proliferation

U.S. Threat Perceptions and Priorities for NE Asia

- Issues/challenges in nontraditional security:
  - Human rights
  - Human security
  - Public health
  - Food security
  - Economic security, development and prosperity
  - Natural disasters
  - Terrorism
  - Narcotics trafficking
  - International organized crime
  - Information warfare and/or influence operations
  - Contingency planning for emergencies in North Korea

U.S. Views on Cooperation

- Generally, the U.S. approach to cooperation—multilateral, minilateral, trilateral, or bilateral—depends upon the issue area
  - For issues addressed in multilateral forums, the U.S. and ROK can cooperate to achieve common goals.
  - Climate change, global food insecurity, natural disasters, human displacement/migration, economic security (including supply chain issues)
  - Minilateral (about 4-8 states) cooperation can incorporate the U.S., the ROK, and other like-minded partners (4-party talks, 5-party talks), usually on an ad hoc basis
  - Trilateral U.S.-ROK-Japan security cooperation is underutilized despite many shared interests: missile threats and missile defense, maritime security, space security, cybersecurity, organized crime, cybersecurity, WMD proliferation, export controls, and counter-proliferation

U.S. Views on Cooperation

- US-ROK common interests and areas for cooperation:
  - Detering NK aggression and preventing conflict (the armistice regime, OPCON)
  - Extended deterrence and nuclear umbrella
  - Missile threats and missile defense
  - Maritime security
  - Space security
  - Cybersecurity
  - WMD proliferation, export controls, and counter-proliferation
  - Countering the global authoritarian wave
  - Strategic communications
  - Public diplomacy, public affairs, MIS/PSYOPS
  - Contingency planning for emergencies in North Korea

Recommendations

- Beware of U.S. domestic politics wildcard
  - Attrition of authoritarianism, rise of racism and politics of fear, isolationism
- Assess common threat perceptions and risks
- Assess the adequacy of plans and instruments for addressing threats
- Increase cooperation where planning and preparation are inadequate; take advantage of the opportunities to address weaknesses (real or perceived)
- Increase economic security cooperation (including supply chain issues)
- Maintain military readiness; beware of salami-slicing aimed at dismantling UNC and Armistice regime; ROK has OPCON of ROK Forces
- Improve strategic communications
- Exploit NK weaknesses without antagonizing Pyongyang

Thank You!

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In examining the prospects for peace and security on the Korean Peninsula, it is useful to start broad in framing the problem—set before homing in on specific objectives and obstacles. Observers tend to view conflict as a binary between war and peace, but the practical reality is that there is a spectrum which extends from war through a negative peace to a positive peace. The conditions on the Korean Peninsula represent that of a negative peace—that is, an absence of militarized conflict—and the ultimate goal is to advance the former parties to war towards the behaviors, mutual confidence, and relationships that render the notion of the use of military force against one another either untenable or unfathomable—i.e., the positive peace. The peace processes the world over is never quick or straightforward, but there are additional obstacles for the Korean Peninsula in the form of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea system of governance, the COVID pandemic, and the Kim regime’s “triple track”; that is, its current focus on internal stability, weapons development, and external shaping. When the former parties to conflict finally find themselves back at the negotiating table, denuclearization will naturally be a central focus, but there are other issues that can be addressed in promoting a positive peace. Throughout this process, the international community plays essential roles in fostering meaningful progress on the Korean Peninsula.
Theme 2.
Peace and Korean Unification: Korea’s Perspective

Moderator
Mr. George Hutchinson

Speakers
Dr. Sang Hyun Lee
Dr. Min Hong
Dr. Young Jun Kim
With the inauguration of Yoon Suk-yeol administration, significant changes are expected in South Korea’s approach to both North Korea and foreign policy in general. Whereas Moon Jae-in administration focused on building an inter-Korean peace process, Yoon is expected to follow in the footsteps of previous conservative administrations and put North Korea’s complete denuclearization as the basis of improving inter-Korean relations while working toward establishing a “comprehensive strategic alliance” with the United States. That means both deepening economic and political ties with Washington, as well as expanding that cooperation beyond the Korean Peninsula to address more regional and global challenges.

**Shifts in North Korean Policy and Foreign Policy**

President Yoon outlined in a post-election speech South Korea’s daunting task is to strengthen its global diplomatic capabilities amidst growing North Korean nuclear threats and strategic competition between US and China. He also noted that it is important to build strong defense capabilities that can reliably suppress any provocation in order to protect the safety, property, territory and sovereignty of the people. Yoon said he would deal firmly with North Korea’s illegal and unreasonable actions on principle but would leave the door open for inter-Korean dialogue at any time. He also declared that South Korea should be reborn as a ‘global pivotal state’ that contributes to freedom, peace and prosperity based on bold diplomacy and strong security.

Regarding US-ROK relations, Yoon went on to say that he would rebuild the US-ROK alliance and strengthen a comprehensive strategic alliance by sharing the core values of liberal democracy, market economy and human rights. As for China and Japan, he said he intends to develop mutually respectful ROK-China relations, create future-oriented ROK-Japan relations and strengthen diplomacy around economic security by establishing a tailored global cooperation network for each region. He also declared he would make South Korea a respected country that fulfills its role and responsibility in the international community.

Beyond the lofty rhetoric in his speech, Yoon is expected to bring about significant changes to South Korea’s approach to North Korea and the US-ROK alliance. Regarding the ROK’s North Korea policy, Yoon has emphasized that the abolition of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program is a prerequisite for all further engagement with the North, making the “realization of North Korea’s complete denuclearization” the top foreign and security policy priority. Yoon’s proposal can be seen as the successor of the Lee Myung-bak’s “Denuclearization 3000” plan and the Park Geun-hye’s “trust-building process on the Korean Peninsula,” as it mentions that economic support for North Korea is possible even before the denuclearization process is completed if practical denuclearization
measures are taken by the DPRK. In particular, Yoon pledged his intention to respond to
the North Korea based on close coordination with the US. He referred to current
international cooperation in implementing the UN Security Council’s sanctions on North
Korea, and, like Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye, he emphasized denuclearizing the
DPRK via maximum pressure. More specifically, he believes nuclear negotiations with
North Korea should be conducted on the principle of reciprocity and requiring a
predictable denuclearization roadmap that specifies reciprocal measures according to
step-by-step denuclearization process. While this is not much different from the ROK’s
existing denuclearization negotiation method, it does require North Korea to make the
first move, unlike Moon’s willingness to jump start negotiations with peace initiatives up
front.

In regard to foreign policy, Yoon pledged to pursue a comprehensive strategic alliance
between South Korea and the US as a key foreign policy priority, which is seen as a
continuation of the ‘21st Century Comprehensive Strategic Alliance’ emphasized during
the Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye administrations. Comprehensive strategic
alliance is the expansion of relations between the ROK and the United States beyond the
domains of military and security cooperation, into such realms as politics, economics,
society and culture.

Moon Jae-in’s government had also agreed to a similar approach with the United States,
but Yoon views the current ROK-US relationship as in a crisis of trust and wants to try to
reinvigorate the alliance to the level upheld by Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye. Yoon
has said he will actively cooperate with the US for the future vision and common interests
of the Indo-Pacific region and global order. In particular, he stressed that South Korea
would actively participate in cooperative mechanisms, such as the Quad, by pursuing
policies based on liberal democratic values.

Challenges Ahead for the Yoon Administration

There are a lot of internal and external challenges facing the Yoon administration. In
domestic politics, Yoon Suk-yeol, who won the election by such a narrow margin, faces a
situation where he has to launch his administration with less than a majority of electoral
votes and while his party holds only 110 out of 300 seats in the National Assembly. Yoon’s
government needs to execute political reform and integration tasks when a rough road
regarding the composition of the cabinet and state administration most likely lies ahead.
In addition, South Korea’s status and role in the US-China strategic competition needs to
be redefined. Economically, Yoon faces the task of increasing jobs—especially white-collar
jobs for an overeducated, underemployed workforce—and pushing the country to be a
future science and technology powerhouse through achieving innovative growth.

Nevertheless, the foreign policy challenge that exists is as significant as the one that exists
in South Korea’s domestic politics. The foreign policy environment and conditions that
the next South Korean government will face can be summarized into three sets of
challenges.

First, the international situation is expected to continue systemic fragmentation due to
intensifying competition among global powers, deteriorating international governance,
and the weakening of institutions and norms worldwide, due to the devastating impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. Second, Russia’s invasion of the Ukraine is pushing the world into a second Cold War. As the Ukrainian war rapidly transforms the world into a confrontation between liberal democracy and authoritarian states with US-Europe vs. China-Russia, Korea should pay attention to minimizing the risks posed when choosing a side. Third, the strategic situation on the Korean Peninsula can be summarized as a peace process that is extremely unclear due to being under the triple distress of the suspension of nuclear negotiations between the US and North Korea, the suspension of inter-Korean dialogue and North Korea’s voluntary isolation since the pandemic erupted.

The immediate challenge for the Yoon Suk-yeol administration will be North Korea’s nuclear and missile provocations. It is an important task to continue the lifeline of the peace process while preparing for North Korea’s military provocations. Since the beginning of 2022, North Korea has continued to test-fire various ballistic missiles. North Korea is focusing on developing various types of missiles, including the Hwasong-17 missile, which is an intercontinental ballistic missile, as well as intermediate-range, short-range and SLBMs. North Korea even invaded the NLL (Northern Limit Line) for the first time since the two Koreas signed the Comprehensive Military Agreement on September 19, 2018. Furthermore, a new building has been built on the site of the partially dismantled Punggye-ri nuclear test site, and efforts to restore at least some part of the site for future nuclear testing is suspected. If North Korea continues its nuclear and missile provocations and the Yoon Suk-yeol government takes a strong response, inevitably tension will rise on the Korean Peninsula. Expanding the scope of peace while preventing military conflicts between the two Koreas will be the most important challenge for the Yoon Suk-yeol administration.

2 People Power Party’s election pledge [in Korean], “A New Republic of Korea Made by Fairness and Common
Dr. Min Hong
Director of North Korean Research Division, Korea Institute for National Unification

The massage of Military Parade in Commemoration of the 90th Anniversary of the Foundation of the Korean People’s Revolutionary Army in North Korea

A military parade marking the 90th anniversary of the foundation of the Korean People’s Revolutionary Army in North Korea was unprecedented in terms of its size with a focus on sending military messages toward the outside world. The essence of Chairman Kim’s speech is that North Korea will pursue the sophistication of nuclear weapons at a maximum speed. Instead of sending a direct message toward South Korea and the US, North Korea pinpointed uncertainty in the international situation as a reason for advancing their nuclear weapons. That was an intentional change made at the security level transformed from an approach of deploying a circumstantial reason by taking an issue with the US. What deserves the attention is that North Korea vowed to ‘implement the second mission’ when ‘national fundamental interests are in jeopardy.’ It hints that North Korea could preemptively use nuclear weapons if it judges that the ‘fundamental interests’ are violated. It could be interpreted as an intention to set its doctrine in an aggressive tone while countering the following issues: the US’s nuclear policy, the possibility of a preemptive strike by the US, the strengthening of the US-ROK extended deterrence and South Korea’s reinforced military force. The DPRK seemly intends to supplement its deterrent capability against the US with rhetorical tools by stating as if the barrier to the use of nuclear weapons is lowered.

Aggressive Nuclear Doctrine and a Mix of Confidence for Nuclear Diversification and Anxiety over the US-ROK Force

Although North Korea has sought to advance nuclear weapons and develop diversified tactical nuclear weapons, it will take time for the North to be able to mount miniaturized nuclear warheads onto a missile as the technical level of ICBM is not that high. A change of nuclear doctrine to an aggressive tone, as revealed in Chairman Kim’s speech, is not only a show of confidence owing to the diversification of nuclear weapons but also a rhetorical response amidst mixed feelings about the gap between its actual ability and the reality and the reinforced military power of the US and the ROK.

The Gap between Self-declared Nuclear Weapons State and the Actual Deterrent Capability against the US

On the military front, North Korea appears to be most fearful of the US’s precise, preemptive capability, its advanced reconnaissance ability, the seizure of Carrier Strike Group (CSG), formidable firepower, and the securing of the overwhelming command of the air. North Korea’s tactical and strategic weapons have been devised to have responsive and deterrent capabilities against the US. However, it remains to be challenging to
strengthen dete
rrent capabilities against the US due to the difficulties of securing the ICBM capabilities, the actual deployment of ICBM, technical difficulties of miniaturizing nuclear weapons to diversify tactical nuclear weapons, the emboldened ROK-US extended deterrence, and the ROK's enhanced responsive capabilities. For the time being, North Korea seems to focus on making tangible progress on nuclear sophistication. It is also possible that Pyongyang could make a visible transition of doctrine to an aggressive posture depending on the improvement of diversification of tactical nuclear weapons and striking capabilities of various ranges.

Leaving Open the Prospect of Bilateral Negotiations while Continuing to Advance Nuclear Weapons

The new South Korean government needs to understand the strategic and tactical stance of North Korea from a range of perspectives. In other words, there needs to be a comprehensive understanding of North Korea’s intentions. North Korea may attempt to change its attitude at a certain time in the future once it completes its development of offensive strategic weapons. In this way, North Korea may return to the negotiation table on equal grounds with the U.S. and not be unilaterally forced to denuclearize and instead be recognized as a nuclear state to discuss limited nuclear arms control. Based on the pursuit of this ultimate goal, North Korea will seek to achieve the following narrower objectives; prompt South Korea to increase its military capabilities and to assume a hardline stance as much as possible to use it as justification for its own actions, induce the U.S. to lower the barrier for negotiations by leveraging America’s position of not being able to explicitly counter North Korea’s advancement of nuclear weapons, and proudly display the regime’s domestic accomplishments through the advancement of nuclear weapons. ‘Double standards,’ ‘threat of preemptive strikes,’ ‘abolishing the concept of a primary enemy,’ ‘withdrawal of hostile policies against North Korea,’ and ‘actions for self-defense’ are all specific examples of North Korea’s responses and aggressive logic for the operationalization of these higher and lower-level goals. Future policies on North Korea need to be designed in response to these objectives of North Korea.

However, it is impossible to exclude the prospect of a new path in the mid- and long-term. North Korea has recently clarified its position supporting Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. While it may be a regular diplomatic gesture, reports of high-ranking officials from North Korea and Russia exchanging opinions on cooperating on current affairs may signal that the two countries have reached either a direct or indirect consensus on fostering closer strategic cooperation. A similar position has been observed regarding China as well. Regardless of negotiations between Russia and Ukraine or the loss of Russia’s global reputation, North Korea may be seeking to buy time or gain assistance necessary for its development of weapons or be preparing for the prospect of negotiations with the U.S. eventually failing through a joint stance with Russia and China. An accurate response to North Korea’s behavior is needed more than ever during the period of power transition in Seoul and the early stages of the new Yoon administration in the ROK.
As the President, the new Republic of Korea President Yoon's first message on North Korea on inauguration day was much warmer and softer than his message during the Presidential political campaign. His suggestion for denuclearization first step included a stop of production of nuclear material and nuclear test and open to IAEA verification, not full destruction of all nuclear weapons. This is somewhat similar to the Moon Administration and so called a step-by-step denuclearization or even nuclear arms control approach. Nonetheless, it seems that North Korean leader Kim Jong Un already decided his five-year plan towards the new ROK administration that North Korea gave up any talks or inter-Korean relations with the Yoon Administration and will focus on nuclear and missile tests and deeper security cooperation with China and Russia. North Korea clearly knows that China and Russia will not join any US-led UN sanctions in the circumstances of the US-China strategic competition, the US-Russian tension and a long war of the Russian Ukraine conflict. Whatever Yoon's approach towards North Korea, including vaccination support and humanitarian assistance to North Korea is, North Korea knows that the Yoon Administration will strengthen the ROK-US combined military exercise and the ROK-US-Japan security cooperation as well as joining an Indo Pacific strategy club of the US. Thus, during the five years of the new ROK administration, there will be no better inter-Korean relations, no denuclearization talks between the US and North Korea, but there is a high possibility of North Korean provocations like the Yeonpyeong Island attacks and Cheonan sinking incidents and China-Russia-North Korea security and military cooperation including combined military exercises of three countries in their territories. Only variable in changing this direction for five years is the win of the former President Trump in the 2024 US Presidential election. Otherwise, for the next five years, in the Korean Peninsula, there will be a Cold War or even another 2017 Korean Peninsula crisis.
Theme 3.
Prospect and Challenge for Peace and Security in Northeast Asia:
The U.S.-Korea Dialogue

Moderator
Prof. Ellen Laipson

Speakers
Mr. Robert Collins
Gen. Inbum Chun
Dr. Intaek Han
Challenges for a Renewed Republic of Korea-United States Alliance

ROK President Yoon and his generally conservative approach to domestic and foreign policy is likely to have a positive impact on the ROK-US Alliance. Nonetheless, North Korea and the Kim regime will continue to present a correspondingly challenge to both the alliance and South-North relations. To that end, the national security interests of both the ROK and the US benefit from the alliance and it is in the interests of both nations to ensure we have a strong alliance.

President Yoon and the new ROK administration must see the alliance as a mutually beneficial security partnership where both sides bring different but complimentary capabilities and competencies to support the national defense of the ROK.

Successfully shaping the ROK economy is a critical aspect to the Yoon Administration as it is for every nation-state. This presentation will not dive into the economic challenges associated with the world’s current challenges associated with current supply chain issues, coronavirus impacts, or resource shortfalls, but does acknowledge that those issues impact foreign and national security policies.

Though the Yoon Administration’s policies regarding North Korea lie at the forefront of its foreign policy, moving from strategic ambiguity of the past administration to strategic clarity is a central component of its overall national security policy. As the Yoon Administration maneuvers to clarify its position on ROK-China and ROK-Japan relations, it is compelled to weigh the impact on both domestic policy as well as its relation to the ROK-US Alliance.

Likely the most threatening challenges the Yoon Administration will face is the quickly developing extremes in North Korea’s own challenges. Kim Jong-un regime focus on security and economic emphasis on nuclear weapons, missiles and cyber warfare has come at the expense of the food insecurity, malnutrition and overall health deficiencies of the general North Korean population. Where these uncomplimentary dynamics lead is undoubtedly a series of internal crises that may cause the Kim regime to miscalculate its security competence and potentially lash out militarily.
Bridging the Perspectives 2

Gen. Inbum Chun
Lieutenant General (Retired), Republic of Korea

With a new conservative government in Korea, we will now have an opportunity to review the foreign policy of the past five years and continue those that have been successful and find other directions for those that have not been successful. For this session, I would like to focus on regional security issues that I feel are critical for ROK-US relations.

First is the US and Korean military training. Many Koreans are focused on the ROK US combined exercises that have been suspended but there is a much more serious issue. As we have witnessed in the Ukraine conflict, a single soldier armed with a modern weapon can destroy tanks and aircraft that are millions of dollars in cost alone. The North Korean military has been keen to this many years ago and have equipped themselves with weapons such as the North Korean made “Fire bird” and the “Fire Rifle”. The Fire Bird is an equivalent of the US Javelin anti-tank missile and is as capable. The Fire Rifle is an equivalent of the US Stinger anti-aircraft missile. The North Koreans have fielded these weapons widely among their ranks.

The best way to survive these types of weapons is through new counter measures and training and the most important part of that training is night training. Under the cover of darkness tanks and aircraft can overcome these threats with far more effectiveness. Unfortunately, Korean and US tanks and aircraft have been unable to conduct night training because of local demonstrations. Many Korean units have given up night training and US units go abroad to conduct night fire and flight training.

Local citizens that have been living in and around the live fire ranges have endured noise and sometimes shrapnel from exploding bombs. We need to compensate for their sacrifice at all costs and secure these ranges for future night training.

Second is the United Nations Command (UNC) in Korea. The UN Command was established under UN security resolutions 82/82 and 84. The UNC is tasked with defending the ROK and establishing lasting peace on the Korean peninsula. The UN mandated that the US take responsibility for the operation of UNC and that mission is performed by the US Joint Chiefs of Staff. Since the Korean War, the mission of UNC is to maintain peace on the Korean peninsula and in contingency redeploy and integrate units coming to the aid of Korea.

The UNC overlooks the Armistice agreement that maintains peace on the Korean peninsula and manages the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). In recent years, there has been mounting criticism towards UNC. The two main criticisms are that the UNC is enlarging itself to control the ROK military after OPCON transition and that the UNC is disturbing inter-Korean relations.
Since the Korean War, the role of the UNC was limited to these roles and much of the warfighting duties were transferred or shared with the ROKUS Combined Forces Command (ROKUS CFC). Since the UNC and ROK CFC commander was the same American general, much of the day-to-day functions could be shared. But when OPCON Transition occurs this has to be divided. This is why the UN Command needs to expand. Furthermore, the “Revitalization of the UN command” will grow the staff from about 60 to 200. Among this 200, 150 will be Korean staff that will make it impossible for Korean interests to be bypassed.

There is no reason or authority for the UNC to interfere in inter-Korean relations. The UNC protects those entering into the DMZ and works to ensure the safe passage of inter-Korean material and personnel travelling through the DMZ. This is a critical mission that the Korean people need to understand.

As we are witnessing in the war in the Ukraine, a modern-day conflict involving the interests of a member of the UN Security Council cannot be expected to come to an agreement. In Korea, however, we already have a UN entity that has already gained justification for nations of the willing to help Korea preserve freedom in the case of a contingency.

Third is Korea-Japan relations. On 22 August 2019, the Moon administration concluded the General Security of Military Information Agreement: GSOMIA. The reason for this decision, was because of the “important change in security relations caused by the exemption of Korea from Japan’s Whitelist” and “that continuing the GSOMIA would not be in accordance with Korea’s national interests”.

It is absolutely critical for Korea’s security that we have access to US and Japanese bases in Japan and it is absolutely important for Japanese safety that Korea is independent. There are many issues between Korea and Japan to include historical, economic and even naming issues. Korea faces a challenge where Chinese aircraft cross into the Korean Air Defense Identification Zone (KADIZ) on a regular basis and where North Korea can strike South Korean targets in three minutes from launch. We need the GSOMIA to integrate the resources of not only Korea and Japan but the tri-lateral efforts of the US-Korea and Japan.

Besides GSOMIA, we have cyber threats, terror and sea rescue activities that require Korea-Japan cooperation to protect the lives and fortunes of the Korean people and that of Japan. Therefore, we need to separate security issues with other bi-lateral issues that are controversial.

Fourth is the participation of the ROK government in military exercises. The Korean government used to participate during the August exercises but was suspended with the combined exercises four years ago. During these exercises the Korean government reviewed mobilization plans and other critical areas mostly on paper. In the future the Korean government must participate with its head of government to discuss the procedures for change of defense readiness posture, reactions to North Korean Nuclear threat and other very important and critical bi-lateral issues.
Lastly, the issue of US base return and the contamination and clean-up of these bases. Recent news reports have claimed that the contamination of the US base in Yongsan Seoul is 500 times that of Korean standards and that cancer causing substances were discovered. The application of US environmental standards to Korea by the US government is unfair but at the same time to demand that the US pay for the cleanup is a heartless demand when one remembers that US assistance seventy years ago helped Korea when we were fighting for our survival. Koreans also must remember that we asked the US to leave Yongsan in the first place implying we would pay for the cost of the move.

I would also like to mention that the cleanup and payment of the returned bases is not a military issue. In other words, the US commander has no authority in this matter. All negotiations should be between the Korean government and the US government. Also, it is not as if the entire base is contaminated. Most of the contamination is around the gas station, fuel storage and maintenance facilities for vehicles. Finally, it will take ten years to survey and negotiate an agreement for cleanup and payment. Rather than spend this time and considering the opportunity costs, it would be better to accept the bases and use it as best we can and figure out which is more cost effective.

The mission of a soldier is to protect the lives and property of the people. But in order for the soldier to do so, it requires the support of the people. The military must do its part to gain the trust of its people, but it needs the understanding and support of the nation.
In the past, North Korean nuclear weapons such as ICBMs were made to attack far distance targets which did not bring much of a threat to South Korea as it did to the U.S. Recently, however, North Korea’s short-range missiles present the same kind of threat to South Korea as it has been to the U.S. This increasingly changes the nature of the security threat we face today. In order to go against and provide relevant protections for both the U.S and the ROK, the old 69-year-old US-ROK alliance must be addressed and updated accordingly.

Previously, the missiles created in North Korea were only long-range missiles made to target the United State. Recently, North Korea has developed short range missiles with capabilities of attaching a nuclear warhead. This poses a serious threat to South Korea and fundamentally changes South Korea’s threat perception. Five or six years ago, North Korea’s nuclear weapon was not a major concern of South Korea as much as it was to the United States. The North Koreans were concentrating on the ICBMs was made for long and medium ranges to deliver the nuclear weapons to the target. Now, North Koreans have shorter range nuclear headed missiles. North Korea has threatened that they were willing to use these weapons against any target. The best tool that the ROK has to counter this threat is the alliance with the U.S. However, the changing nature of security threat in the Korean peninsula calls for revisiting this alliance system.

The current U.S.-ROK alliance is outdated as it has not changed for the past 69 years since its creation. The US-ROK alliance should be updated with implementation of two changes: 1) proposing the new division of boards and responsibilities between the U.S. and the ROK and 2) adding new approaches in dealing with North Korea in this pre-nuclear and pre-missile age.

To change the previous relationship of the U.S. as the protector and the ROK as the protected into a new relationship status that allows South Korea to play a bigger role in taking up roles and responsibilities, one suggestion is to allow the ROK to lead the U.S. in the regional North Korean crisis.

My last point is that the attempt to practice hardline and softline policies on North Korea has not been effective. Thus, the continued increasing threat of North Korea must be addressed with a new approach of bringing North Korea to interact more with the outside world in order to change their ideal and identity. This is a challenge that South Korea can’t accomplish alone and thus need the help of the international community.
Conclusion

Concluding Remarks
Prof. Ellen Laipson
It is my honor to close out the symposium with some closing remarks that will try to summarize several of the key themes and “takeaways” from our very interesting day together.

In listening to the three panels, I have identified at least five themes that are worthy of further reflection, as we continue to address the enduring issues related to security in Northeast Asia with a particular focus on the dynamics on the Korean peninsula.

First, let me begin with the broadening of the definition of security - what is covered by the field of security studies and what belongs in other academic disciplines. Roland Wilson discussed this with students yesterday. Our Center for Security Policy Studies looks deeply at traditional security dilemmas within and between states, and the profound questions of war and peace. At the same time, we need to widen the aperture to consider how non-traditional security issues, from climate change to migration to economic inequality, or food and energy insecurity, are all part of the equation. They have a direct impact on what societies and states are stable and secure, and which ones may be facing stresses that could lead to conflict with their neighbors or with the great powers. In the case of the Korean peninsula and factors that could drive instability, both hard security and non-traditional security are at play, proving that we have to be more agile and flexible in defining what is in the security of policy topics.

Second, are the causes and consequences of deglobalization. We heard about the way economic insecurities have been exacerbated, driven by supply chain disruptions and all the changes in travel and mobility brought about by the covid-19 virus and its global spread. Even before covid, we witnessed political pressures and changes within societies, certainly including the United States, over the way globalization’s benefits deepened gaps between rich and poor. These effects have changed the domestic politics of states and can have a direct or indirect effect on how ruling parties think about their national security priorities. At the same time, the recent presidential summit underscored how both the US and the ROK continue to invest in globalization’s benefits, from supply chain resilience to the productive use of technology and ways to expand economic prosperity.

Third, are concerns about governance and its shortcomings. In the panels we heard misgivings about how the UN is organized, including in its mission to Korea, the fragile ecosystem of the Kim dynasty, political and cultural polarization in the United States, for example. This erosion of respect for institutions is leading to declining credibility and confidence about American leadership, which clearly affects the alliance structure in East Asia, and how regional states determine their own national security strategies. There was
Fourth, and on a more upbeat note, is the gradual change in the ROK’s status in the international system and what the repercussions of that might be for peace and security on the peninsula. Korea has established itself as a global actor, not a single-issue country where it only engages the outside world on the existential issue of its relations with the DPRK. On the contrary, Korea is now recognized as an effective middle power, and its influence and leadership are apparent on a range of international issues, from climate change to international trade. This rise in Korea’s global influence has a direct impact on the alliance relationship, and one theme of the recent Biden-Yoon summit was refreshing the 70-year alliance to give more equal status and responsibility to Korea. The two leaders discussed the traditional purpose of the alliance, to deter the DPRK (and China) and the value of extended deterrence based on the US nuclear umbrella. At the same time, as General Chun reminded us, there are important alliance management issues that require adjustment, to meet Korean expectations of a more equal security partnership.

The last broad theme is the enduring dilemma about whether or how to engage North Korea. The US focus has long given priority to eliminating the nuclear threat from the North but finds it hard to create the necessary diplomatic momentum. In our symposium, Dr. Han offered his ideas about how to stimulate or initiative a more constructive approach to the DPRK, that is non-judgmental and more realistic. Several speakers emphasized the need to engage and keep channels of communication open even when the parties profoundly disagree on essential issues. The extra isolation of DPRK caused by covid has also convinced some in Korea and several American speakers that there may be a new opportunity to engage on covid response and/or food insecurity. The two presidents addressed this immediate humanitarian need at the summit.

Yet we should have no illusions that the US and the ROK will always agree on how to handle the DPRK. The ROK does not see a military threat from China; it’s a neighbor to be managed. U.S. on the other hand has organized its Indo-Pacific strategy around the notion that relations with China are likely to remain difficult and competitive, even if direct conflict can be avoided.

To wrap up, I am so pleased that we shared a day that provided fresh insights from some of Korea’s leading public intellectuals, the US Charge d’Affaires, and several experienced US defense experts, who shared their thinking about the recent presidential summit and US-ROK relations, as well as the longer-term challenges and opportunities to build peace and security in this region. The topic of this year’s symposium will surely demand our attention again in the future, and we hope that you will join us for future events exploring these vital topics about peace and security in Korea and Northeast Asia.

Thank you.
Annex 1: Panelist Biographies

**Dr. Robert Matz** | Campus Dean, George Mason University Korea

Dr. Robert Matz is the Mason Korea Campus Dean. He is responsible for leading and managing all aspects of Mason Korea’s programs and operations in close coordination with Mason’s Fairfax Campus. He brings to Mason Korea his experience in academic leadership, his commitment to excellence in teaching and research, and his dedication to the opportunities for international exchange that Mason Korea offers.

**Dr. Mark J. Rozell** | Dean of Schar School of Policy and Government

Dr. Mark J. Rozell is Dean of the Schar School of Policy and Government at George Mason University where he also holds the Ruth D. and John T. Hazel Chair in Public Policy. He is a widely published scholar who has authored nine books and edited twenty books on various topics in U.S. government and politics including the presidency, religion and politics, executive privilege, media and politics, and interest groups.

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**Dr. Ji Hye Lim** | Acting Director, Center for Security Policy Studies-Korea

Ji Hye Lim is an assistant professor in the Global Affairs Program and serves as an acting director of Center for Security Policy Studies-Korea. Her research sits at the intersection of international and comparative political economy, particularly focusing on economic liberalization and economic security. Her current research focuses on countries’ efforts to stabilize supply chains in an attempt to enhance their security as well as economy. She is working on a project of reshoring policies in an advanced economy.

**Mr. Chris Del Corso** | U.S. Chargé d’Affaires ad interim

Christopher Del Corso is a career member of the U.S. Senior Foreign Service with the rank of Minister Counselor. He assumed his current position as Chargé d’Affaires ad interim at U.S. Embassy Seoul on July 16, 2021. Prior to this posting, Mr. Del Corso served in Washington, DC as the Executive Director for the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, and before that was the Minister Counselor for Management Affairs and acting Deputy Chief of Mission at U.S. Embassy Seoul. From 2015-2016, Mr. Del Corso served as a Senior Advisor to the Deputy Secretary for Management and Resources. He also served as the Senior Management Officer in U.S. Embassy Kabul’s International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Office in 2014-2015, where he helped oversee over one billion dollars of U.S. foreign assistance to Afghanistan.
Dr. Daniel Pinkston | Lecturer in International Relations, Troy University

Dr. Daniel A. Pinkston is based in Seoul as a full-time lecturer in international relations with Troy University. He was the Northeast Asia Deputy Project Director for the International Crisis Group in Seoul, and the director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. He is the author of *The North Korean Ballistic Missile Program*, and he has published several scholarly articles on North Korean WMD and Korean security affairs. He also served as a Korean linguist in the U.S. Air Force.

Dr. Mike Bosack | Deputy Secretary, United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission

Michael Bosack is the Deputy Secretary of the UN Command Military Armistice Commission. There, he is responsible for building and implementing strategies for enforcing the Korean Armistice Agreement, negotiating with the Korean People’s Army, and facilitating diplomatic efforts between the Republic of Korea, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, and all states affiliated with UN Command.

Mr. George Hutchinson | Visiting Fellow, Center for Security Policy Studies-Korea

George Hutchinson is a visiting fellow at the Center for Security Policy Studies, George Mason-Korea. He is also the Managing Editor of the *International Journal of Korean Studies* as well as a board member of the International Council on Korean Studies. Additionally, Mr. Hutchinson is a Senior Regional Planner advising and supporting U.S. Air Force basing issues in the Republic of Korea. He previously served as an officer in the U.S. Air Force, specializing as a Northeast Asia Foreign Area Officer, Logistics Readiness Officer, and Korean linguist.

Dr. Sang Hyun Lee | President of Sejong Institute

Dr. Sang Hyun Lee serves as President of the Sejong Institute in Korea and the Korea Nuclear Policy Society (KNPS). He is a member of the Asia- Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament and the Korea-US Nuclear Policy Leadership Initiative. He has been a visiting scholar at the Institute for Development and Security in Stockholm, Sweden, and DC’s Stimson Center. His research interests include international politics and security, Korea-US relations, inter- Korean relations, nuclear security and nonproliferation, and East Asian security issues.
**Dr. Min Hong** | Director of North Korean Research Division, Korea Institute for National Unification

Dr. Min Hong is a Director of the North Korean Research Division at the Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU). His main research areas are North Korean Politics, Military and Society, North Korean Foreign Policy and South Korea Policy, Denuclearization and Peace regime on the Korean Peninsula, North Korean Urban and Development Strategy, Division of Korean Peninsula. He is a Policy Advisor at the National Security Office of the Blue House, Policy Advisor at the Ministry of Unification, Policy Advisor Ministry of National Defense, Policy Advisor at the National Unification Advisory Council, Policy Assistant at the Inter-Korean Cooperation Section of the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries and Advisor at the Inter-Korean Cooperation Section of Paju city.

**Dr. Young Jun Kim** | Director of Center for Northeast Asian Affairs, Research Institute for National Security Affairs, Korea National Defense University

Dr. Youngjun Kim is currently teaching as a professor at Korean National Defense University in the Department of International Politics, National Security College. He has served as a member of several prestigious organizations such as the Presidential Peaceful Unification Advisory Council’s Central Committee and the ROK President Office’s National Security Advisory Board. Dr. Kim’s recent publication includes “Negotiating Nuclear Arms Control with North Korea: Why and How?” (2021), “The Wilsonian State: The Korea in Modern World History” (2021).

**Prof. Ellen Laipson** | Director, Center for Security Policy Studies

Ellen Laipson is the Director of the International Security program at the Schar School of Government and Policy at George Mason University. She also serves as the Director of the Center for Security Policy Studies based in the Arlington campus of George Mason University. She was former President and CEO of The Stimson Center and a board member of International Security and Diplomacy including the International Advisory Council of the International Institute for Strategic Studies and American Diplomacy Center Board of Trustees. She served as the Vice Chair of the National Intelligence Council, a board member of the Asia Foundation, President Obama’s Intelligence Advisory Board and board of the Secretary of State’s Foreign Affairs Policy.
Mr. Robert Collins | Senior Advisor, Committee for Human Rights in North Korea

Robert M. Collins, currently a Senior Advisor for the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, is a 37-year veteran employee of the U.S. Department of the Army and served 31 years in various positions with the U.S. military in Korea, including several liaison positions with the Republic of Korea military. In that capacity he developed strategies and policy and planning concepts in pursuit of U.S. and ROK-US Alliance security interests relative to the North Korean threat and regional security challenges. He is a freelance writer focusing on Korean security issues, North Korean human rights, and US interests in Northeast Asia.

Gen. In-Bum Chun | Lieutenant General, Republic of Korea (Ret.)

Lieutenant General In-Bum Chun (ROK, Ret) served 38 years in the South Korean Army and retired in 2016. He was a Visiting Fellow at the Center for East Asia Policy Studies of the Brookings Institution, a Visiting researcher at the US-Korea Institute at SAIS, University of Johns Hopkins, and a Visiting fellow at the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs, Georgia Tech. His awards include three US Legions of Merit, a US Bronze Star Medal and the USSOCOM Medal. Currently, he serves as the Senior Vice president of the AUSA Korea Chapter and is on the Advisory board for the National Bureau of Asian Research.

Dr. Intaek Han | President of Jeju Peace Institute

Dr. Intaek Han is President of the Jeju Peace Institute, an independent, non-profit foreign policy think tank located in Jeju, South Korea. He also serves as Chairman of the Jeju Forum for Peace and Prosperity, an annual multilateral security dialogue for Northeast Asia. An internationalist and a proponent of non-governmental diplomacy, Han focuses his studies on security cooperation, public diplomacy, and the role of security dialogues in promoting international cooperation. Prior to joining the Jeju Peace Institute, Han taught at Ewha Woman’s University, the University of Washington, Seattle, and the University of California, Davis.
Launched in 2014, the Center for Security Policy Studies (CSPS) of Schar School of Policy and Government advances the study of international security. Through its research and extensive array of student programs, CSPS seeks to both generate creative solutions to today’s pressing security challenges and educate tomorrow’s security policymakers. CSPS’s multidisciplinary faculty include experts in economics, history, political science and sociology, as well as a number of distinguished practitioners-in-residence. Located on Mason’s Arlington campus, CSPS also provides unique access to a large number of defense and security experts, including current and former government officials, active and recently retired senior military officers, prominent think tank analysts, and world-renowned scholars.

The Center for Security Policy Studies (CSPS) addresses today’s pressing security issues. Such challenges range from so-called ‘traditional’ threats, including great power conflict, civil war, nuclear proliferation, and terrorism, to so-called ‘nontraditional’ threats, including climate change, pandemic disease, demographic shifts, extreme poverty, state failure and refugee crises. All of these threats transcend traditional academic boundaries. Therefore, CSPS seeks to produce multidisciplinary, policy-relevant research by leveraging experts from across George Mason University.

CSPS has three overarching goals; to facilitate collaboration between scholars and practitioners from across George Mason University and Washington D.C., to generate multidisciplinary research relevant to today’s most pressing defense and security challenges and to attract, recruit, and educate George Mason University’s best and brightest students to prepare them for service as tomorrow’s scholars and leaders.

The objectives of the CSPS branch at Mason Korea Campus include: setting a model for research collaboration and academic exchange with the main campus; creating a research hub connecting the US and Asia and a policy exchange platform between Washington and Seoul; supporting CSPS, the Schar School Faculty, and researchers by connecting to research infrastructure, policy field, and government in Korea; holding joint events between the two campuses; and building a reputable university specialized program and vibrant research environment.