



East China Sea

Spring 2018 Crisis Simulation

Exercise Rules

About the Center for Security Policy Studies

The Center for Security Policy Studies (CSPS) provides a vibrant intellectual space for students and faculty of the Schar School of Policy and Government to work alongside government, military, think tank, and private sector experts to address today's pressing security issues. Such challenges range from so-called 'traditional' threats, including great power conflict, civil war, nuclear proliferation, and terrorism, to so-called 'nontraditional' threats, including climate change, pandemic disease, demographic shifts, extreme poverty, state failure, and refugee crises.

These issues transcend traditional academic boundaries. Therefore, CSPS seeks to produce multidisciplinary, policy-relevant research by leveraging experts from across George Mason University. CSPS also sponsors innovative extracurricular activities for Mason students to prepare them for service as tomorrow's security scholars and leaders. CSPS has three overarching goals:

- Facilitate collaboration between scholars and practitioners from across George Mason University, the Washington Consortium, and the National Capital Region
- Generate multidisciplinary research relevant to today's most pressing defense and security challenges
- Attract, recruit, and educate George Mason University's best and brightest students to prepare them for service as tomorrow's scholars and leaders

Simulation Rules

The actors in the crisis simulation consist of a control cell (simulation staff) and three country teams: China, Japan, and the United States. The control cell plays several important roles in the simulation, including resolving the orders submitted by the country teams and issuing crisis updates based on those outcomes. The country teams are further divided internally into Executive (E), Diplomatic (D), and Military (M) teams. Each of these teams will be confined to its own room, clustered by country as shown in the diagram below. Each functional team will have a CSPS staff member on hand to answer questions and assist in rule conformation.




Figure 1 General Team Organization

After an exercise-wide in-brief, you will break into your country teams. Since you won't know your precise role in the simulation until check-in, you'll have a short time to orient yourself to your roles and to read some background material exclusive to your country team. Once the simulation officially starts, your movements and actions will be restricted by the exercise rules.

Rounds of Play


Each round of play begins with a briefing from a control cell representative in the country team's respective Executive Room that summarizes the previous day's events. As soon as the briefing ends, the clock starts. The round ends when either:

- A. All three countries have submitted their action orders (see below), **or**

B. 45 minutes has elapsed, whichever comes first

- If a team fails to submit an action order before the end of the time limit the control cell will assume that they wish to take no new actions during that round and treat them accordingly.
- The control cell will then schedule the next briefing (sending instructions to each Chief Executive (E)), take 20 – 30 minutes to resolve the orders, and then give the next briefing to begin the subsequent round.
- While the control cell is resolving the orders, you may take a break; however, please stay in your team rooms
- The last round of orders must be submitted by 2:50 PM when the simulation officially ends, no matter how much time remains after the last briefing. **All participants are to report back to Robinson B104 at 3:30 PM** for concluding remarks and the outcome of the scenario.

See below for an example of how the rounds of play could develop:



Time

The way we treat time in the simulation is somewhat unorthodox. Each round of the simulation essentially corresponds to 24 hours of “real time” (from 12 PM to 11:59 AM in Beijing). The control cell will treat action orders received in a round of play as beginning at 12 PM of the corresponding day (Round 1= Day 1, etc.) and then calculate at what point in the future the requested actions will occur. After mapping out all of the action orders in this manner—and taking into account past orders that spilled across days—the control team will then figure out the state of the world at the end of the past day corresponding to the round that just ended. And this will constitute the subject matter of the next briefing.

Roles and Responsibilities

Each country-division (E, D and M) serves a particular role in the simulation and is responsible for different tasks.

- The **Executive (E)** represents a country’s leadership and as such is responsible for developing both the policy objectives and strategy for the entire country team. Having decided on these, the executive must then set information requirements and negotiation guidance for the Diplomats (D) and goals, planning priorities, and tasks for the Military (M). The Executive team cannot participate in negotiations with participants from another country, nor can it draft or edit military options (beyond lining out rejected military options in their entirety).

Each Executive team includes a Chief Executive representing the senior decisionmaking authority on the entire country team. Chief Executives cannot leave their team room; if they do so for non-exercise reasons they are considered “out of play” and cannot interact with any other participants. The Chief Executive is responsible for submitting Action Orders to the control cell (which involves handing the action order to the Country Facilitator, who will not accept Action Orders from anyone but the Chief Executive).

Action Orders: Specify the actions that a country wishes to take in the context of the four dimensions of national power (Diplomatic, Informational, Military, and Economic) and are written on the designated forms and submitted to the Country Facilitator. **Orders including military action *must* activate part**

of a military options list prepared by the Military (see below) and can refer to it by sheet color and number. Action orders for non-military options should be as detailed as possible. The control cell will decide the relative success, as well as the timing of implementation of all action orders, based on realistic estimates of feasibility as well as how they interact with the actions taken by other teams.

- **Diplomats (D)** are responsible for engaging in negotiations with the Diplomats of other countries in order to further the objectives and strategy of their country. With the exception of permanently permitted coordination between the Militaries of the United States and Japan, Diplomats are the **ONLY** participants authorized to speak to members of other country teams, and even then only to other Diplomats. Diplomats are free to talk about whatever they wish during their meetings, but must also recognize that any agreements they come to with other countries are strictly “informal.” That is to say, there is no enforcement mechanism other than what carrots and sticks a country has at its disposal to ensure that others uphold their end of a bargain. The control cell will not enforce any result of any negotiation; however, results of diplomatic agreements captured as Action Orders will be adjudicated for informational impact.
- The **Military (M)** is responsible for both gathering intelligence, providing the Executive with military options, and setting the posture of a country’s forces throughout the theater. One participant will be designated as the Chief Military participant of each country and is the senior decisionmaker within the military functional team.

Military Options List. Color-coded and divided by function (aircraft repositioning, sea vessel repositioning, air mission, etc.), these provide a detailed list of optional military actions from which the Executive may choose. Military options should be as specific and quality-controlled as possible or they risk basic implementation failure. Imagine these as actual orders given to military commanders in the field—if not enough information is provided then they will not know how to carry out the desired action. **Military options lists may be submitted to the Executives (E) at any time. However, the Executives (E) must receive them before the chief executive can submit an action order which implements any option on that list. Military participants are the ONLY participants authorized to prepare Military Options Lists.**

Intelligence Requests: Participants may actively obtain information potentially relevant to their intelligence priorities in three ways: 1) By engaging in talks (Diplomats); 2) Through asset detection (vessels, aircraft, and ground units’ presence or missions in map zones); and 3) through sensor collection requests. Sensor collection requests (available to the U.S. and Japan only) can be used each turn to augment the situational awareness of the country team that implements them. Sensor collection cards are returned to the participants at the beginning of each turn. Upon receipt of a sensor collection card from ANY member of the military team, the team facilitator will appropriately reveal information on the situation map. The same information will automatically become visible on the situation maps displayed in the same country’s Executive and Diplomatic team rooms.

Force Posture. Every turn the Military must prepare a list that sets posture guidelines (observe / report, attack, or defend) for every one of zone in theater. This should go to the Executive along with all Military Options and must be submitted along with the Action Order for that turn. The reactions of assets and stationary defenses (land-based anti-ship and anti-air defenses) to the presence of other country’s assets is entirely dependent on the force posture set for them that turn. The Executive may edit this list, but the Military must draft it.

Communications

To simulate bureaucratic constraints and the difficulties of crisis planning, several limitations have been placed on your ability to communicate. In Figure 1 (above), the dashed lines represent who can talk to whom across teams: only diplomats from the Diplomatic team (D) can talk to each other. The divisions within a country may, of course, talk to each other. However, the following rules apply:

Nobody may enter a room they are not assigned to, even within a country. For example, members of the military division may not be in the executive's room and vice versa. Also, a diplomat from China cannot be in the offices of the U.S. executive corps and vice versa.

This means that all meetings between the executive and diplomatic or military units of a country must take place in the hallway or other common spaces (i.e. these meetings cannot take place inside the executive, military or diplomatic office spaces).

No participants may use electronic devices in ANY capacity for ANY exercise-related purposes.

To make things even more difficult, there are limitations as to how many members of a country-division may leave their assigned office. See below for communication rules by role:

Executive Team: Only one person may leave the room at any time. The Chief Executive cannot leave the room. If he / she does so for non-exercise reasons they are considered out of play and cannot interact with other participants.

Diplomatic Team: Up to three people may leave the room at any time. They are free to interact with diplomatic participants from all three countries and with military and executive participants from their own country. All diplomatic meetings between countries must take place in common spaces. This may compromise privacy and players are free to use any information they overhear.

Military Team: Only one person may leave the room at any time. Military participants may only interact with diplomatic and executive participants from their own country, with the following exceptions: Japanese and American military participants may interact with one another. Chinese military participants may only interact with Japanese or American military participants if both parties' executive teams have put an authorization to do so in the previous turn's action order.




Figure 2 Sample Meetings of Country A

Crisis Scenario

While attention in recent years in the Asia-Pacific has been largely focused on developments in the South China Sea – in particular China’s ongoing island-building efforts and expansion of coast guard activities – a new and potentially more destabilizing “normal” has set in around the East China Sea between China and Japan. This “normal” sees China’s air and coast guard forces penetrating Japanese airspace and territorial waters near the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands with increasing and sustained frequency.

The Senkaku/Diaoyu islands were formally claimed by Japan in 1895 and have been privately owned by a series of Japanese citizens for most of the past 120 years. Aside from a brief period after World War II when the United States controlled the territory, Japan has exercised effective control over the islands since 1895. China began to reassert claims over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in the 1970s, citing historic rights to the area.

Tensions resurfaced in September 2012 when Japan purchased three of the disputed islands from the private owner. The economically significant islands, which are northeast of Taiwan, have potential oil and natural gas reserves, are near prominent shipping routes, and are surrounded by rich fishing areas. Each country claims to have economic rights in an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of two hundred nautical miles from its coast, but that space overlaps because the sea separating China and Japan only spans three hundred and sixty nautical miles. After China discovered natural gas near the overlapping EEZ-claimed area in 1995, Japan objected to any drilling in the area due to the fact that the gas fields could extend into the disputed zone.



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In April 2014, President Barack Obama became the first U.S. president to explicitly state that the disputed islands are covered by the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, but the United States does not take a formal position on their ultimate sovereignty. An accidental military incident or political miscalculation by China or Japan could embroil the United States in armed hostilities with China.

Discussions between Japan and China to develop a crisis management mechanism tool began in 2012. Talks stalled when tensions peaked in 2013 after China declared the establishment of an air defense identification zone, airspace over land in which the identification, location, and control of civil aircraft is performed in the interest of national security. After Japan and China signed a four-point consensus document laying out their differences concerning the disputed islands, bilateral discussions resumed in early 2015, aiming to implement the maritime and aerial communication mechanism.

Rising nationalist sentiments and growing political mistrust heighten the potential for conflict and hinder the capacity for peaceful resolution of the dispute. Though Chinese and Japanese leaders have refrained from forcibly establishing control over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, unauthorized action by local commanders could result in the unintended escalation of hostilities. Through treaty commitments with Japan, a military confrontation could involve the United States. To preserve relations with China and continue cooperation on various issues, the United States has an interest in de-escalating tensions. The U.S. Navy has maintained an active force in the East China Sea to conduct freedom of navigation patrols.

This month saw the activation of a long-sought East China Sea crisis hotline between the senior levels of China and Japan's national security apparatuses. Although it is certainly a welcome development, the escalation mitigation measure – known as the Japan-China Maritime Communications Mechanism, or JCMCM – remains untested.

*** Begin Scenario Developments [EXERCISE ONLY – INCLUDES ELEMENTS OF FICTION]***

After well over a year of increasingly provocative actions, including dramatic expansion of its nuclear weapons program, missile tests into the Sea of Japan, and routine border incursions, the North Korean government abruptly reversed its offer of tripartite talks made at the closing ceremonies of the 2018 Winter Olympics in Pyeongchang, South Korea. Last week the South Koreans mobilized their military reserves and appealed to the United States for help after North Korean artillery units along the DMZ entered an elevated state of readiness. The United States deployed a Stryker Brigade, several fighter squadrons, and two additional missile defense batteries to South Korea and stepped up patrols of naval forces in the region. This in turn has caused the DPRK to disperse its nuclear forces, some of which remain unlocated by U.S. intelligence. U.S. forces have remained in South Korea to deter additional aggression. [NOTE: Forces on the Korean Peninsula are OUT OF PLAY]

Also last week, two U.S. B-52 bombers (ignoring the warnings of Chinese ground controllers that they would engage in emergency defensive measures to defend China's recently claimed air defense identification zone) traveled directly over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, further driving competition to assume control of overlapping territorial claims, including the extent of any state's claim to the EEZs. Following this action, the Japanese government deployed a surface task force to the Senkaku Islands, claiming that it did not violate the terms of recent agreements made by the Japan-China High-Level Consultation on Maritime Affairs (JHCMA) because the Senkakus are covered by language referring to territorial lands and waters.

Yesterday, a Japanese destroyer operating off the coast of the Islands intercepted a Chinese destroyer conducting a freedom of navigation patrol by physically placing itself in the Chinese destroyer's path. The Chinese destroyer refused to change course and targeted the Japanese ship with its fire control radar. Believing it was about to be fired upon, the Japanese ship ordered the crew to battle stations and fired several warning shots across the bow of the Chinese ship. The Chinese ship altered course and returned to international waters. The Chinese ambassador to the United Nations protested Japanese violation of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the Chinese government issued a blistering statement reminding Pacific nations of previous Japanese imperialism. It does not appear that the JCMCM was activated before, during, or after the incident, which some say represent its first real test – and failure.

General Military Planning Guidelines

One of this simulation's major goals is to help students develop a stronger appreciation for the time, energy, and effort required to do good military planning. While we don't want to inundate you with minutiae (just ask someone in the military how fun it is to put together Time Phased Force Deployment Data), we do want you to understand that military units do not magically transport themselves from point A to point B, and that 'Clausewitzian' friction (i.e. Murphy's Law on a grand scale) complicates things tremendously.

To strike the right balance we have grossly simplified Chinese, Japanese, and U.S. military assets (in terms of what they have, how much they have, and where they are positioned). We have not sought to present a scale representation of all the forces present in the theater, but rather those forces that could be realistically deployed in the space of 96 hours or less during a reactive day-to-day decision cycle. At the same time, every military plan you put together will need to answer four questions:

- **Who:** How many units are you sending and from where are they coming? A special operations team? A company? A division?
- **Where:** Where do you want them to go?
- **What/Why:** What are they supposed to do when they get there? Search? Occupy territory? Destroy a target? And how much latitude do they have if events on the ground look different than you anticipated?
- **How:** How will they get from point A to point B? By driving? Riding on vessels? Taking cargo planes?


Although conflict is not an inevitable part of this simulation, it may occur in one of two ways: If two or more units are in the same map zone in the absence of prior diplomatic coordination and/or explicit orders then a 'violent misunderstanding' could result. Or, one unit could purposefully attack another. In either case, chance and force posture will play a role in the outcome. All other things being equal, size and quality will matter. Bigger concentrations of force will tend to prevail over smaller ones and heavier platforms will prevail over lighter ones if they go toe-to-toe.

Assets by Country

Japan				China				United States			
Asset	Icon	Unit (Individual)	Quantity	Asset	Icon	Unit (Individual)	Quantity	Asset	Icon	Unit (Individual)	Quantity
Fighter		Squadron (10)	5	Fighter		Squadron (10)	30	Fighter		Squadron (10)	12
Bomber	N/A	Squadron (10)	0	Bomber		Squadron (10)	8	Bomber		Squadron (10)	3
Surveillance		Squadron (10)	4	Surveillance		Squadron (10)	3	Surveillance		Squadron (10)	4
Anti-Submarine		Squadron (10)	4	Anti-Submarine	N/A	Squadron (10)	0	Anti-Submarine		Squadron (10)	3
Air Transport		Squadron (10)	2	Air Transport		Squadron (10)	6	Air Transport		Squadron (10)	7
Submarine		Vessel (1)	6	Submarine		Vessel (1)	11	Submarine		Vessel (1)	6
Frigate		Vessel (1)	4	Frigate		Vessel (1)	13	Frigate	N/A	Vessel (1)	0
Destroyer		Vessel (1)	12	Destroyer		Vessel (1)	9	Destroyer		Vessel (1)	6
Sea Transport		Vessel (1)	3	Sea Transport		Vessel (1)	8	Sea Transport		Vessel (1)	4
Landing Ship		Vessel (1)	2	Landing Ship		Vessel (1)	4	Landing Ship		Vessel (1)	3
Carrier	N/A	Vessel (1 / 20)	0	Carrier		Vessel (1 / 20)	1	Carrier		Vessel (1 / 20)	2
Amphibious (Light)		Battalion (500)	3	Amphibious (Light)		Battalion (500)	10	Amphibious (Light)		Battalion (500)	8
Amphibious (Mech)		Battalion (500 / 60)	1	Amphibious (Mech)		Battalion (500 / 60)	4	Amphibious (Mech)		Battalion (500 / 60)	2
Airborne Infantry		Battalion (500)	2	Airborne Infantry		Battalion (500)	10	Airborne Infantry		Battalion (500)	5
Special Operations		Team (10)	5	Special Operations		Team (10)	20	Special Operations		Team (10)	19

AOR Map and Zone System

- 01 – Hokkaido Littoral (E)
- 02 – Northern Japan [L]
- 03 – Hokkaido Littoral (W)
- 04 – Vladivostok Littoral
- 05 – Sea of Japan (W)
- 06 – North Korea [L]
- 07 – Liaoning / Jilin [L]
- 08 – Bohai Sea
- 09 – Hebei / Shandong [L]
- 10 – Yellow Sea (W)
- 11 – Yellow Sea (E)
- 12 – South Korea [L]
- 13 – Korea / Japan Strait
- 14 – Sea of Japan (E)
- 15 – Central Japan [L]
- 16 – East Honshu Littoral (N)
- 17 – Southern Japan [L]
- 18 – East Honshu Littoral (S)
- 19 – East China Sea (NE)
- 20 – East China Sea (NW)
- 21 – Jiansu / Zhejiang [L]
- 22 – Henan / Hubei / Anhui [L]
- 23 – Philippine Sea (N)
- 24 – Senkaku [L]
- 25 – Okinawa [L]
- 26 – Okinawa Littoral
- 27 – East China Sea (SE)
- 28 – East China Sea (SW)
- 29 – Fujian / Guangdong [L]
- 30 – Hunan / Jiangxi [L]
- 31 – Taiwan Strait
- 32 – Taiwan [L]
- 33 – Taiwan Littoral
- 34 – Philippine Sea (N)
- 35 – Philippine Sea (NW)
- 36 – South China Sea (E)
- 37 – South China Sea (N)
- 38 – South China Sea (W)
- 39 – Pacific Transit
- 40 – Hawaii / West Coast CONUS
- 41 – Southwest China
- 42 – West China



[L] denotes a land zone (brown outline on the map)